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This Article provides an in-depth analysis of the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Gonzales v. Raich and its ramifications. The Court rejected by a
margin of six to three a Ninth Circuit holding that the Federal Controlled
Substances Act would probably be found unconstitutional as applied to
intrastate users of marijuana who were in conformity with California's
Compassionate Use Act. Although the majority, and Justice Scalia
concurring, found the case to present a relatively straightforward problem
in the application of Commerce Clause doctrine, the three dissenters
(Justice O'Connor joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Thomas)
sounded sharp notes decrying a betrayal of New Federalism principles as
well as an abandonment of United States v. Lopez and United States v.
Morrison.
The Article begins with a detailed analysis of the four different opinions
that the case generated in the Supreme Court, as well as a look at the Ninth
Circuit decision. The lower court's willingness to prefer state law over
federal, as well as the strong federalism themes of the Supreme Court
dissents, represent important data points in any overall debate about
federalism. The Article also devotes substantial attention to the use by
Justices Stevens and Scalia of Wickard v. Filbum. Wickard, with its
aggregation principle, has long been a sore point for conservatives.
However, no justice in Raich called for its overruling, and the Wickard-
based analysis of class-of-activities statutes emerged stronger than ever.
The second Part of the Article discusses the potential impact ofRaich on the
current Court's New Federalism initiative. I contend that to adopt the view
of the Ninth Circuit would have constituted a substantial advance of that set
of precepts. However, the fact that Raich came out the way it did does not
necessarily constitute a rollback for the New Federalism. In particular,
Justice Stevens' insistence on the need for an economic/commercial subject
of regulation as the overall test of validity of statutes with a purported effect
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on interstate commerce represents a reaffirmation of Lopez and Morrison.
The open question is whether his lack of reference to the nonattenuation or
noninfinity arguments of the majority in those cases represents any form of
retreat.
In the third Part I consider some implications of Raich for the federal
criminal law. The Article presents the case as supporting the view that the
American system will continue to be noteworthy for the presence of two
largely overlapping sets of criminal statutes. The Article also examines
specific issues such as the use of jurisdictional elements, as-applied
challenges, and the reach offederal criminal law at the outer boundaries of
national authority. The cases involving federal prosecution for child
pornography are used to illustrate this latter problem as well as to provide
a further elucidation of the general discussion of the current status of
federal criminal laws, particularly those passed under the Commerce
Clause.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Gonzales v. RaichI the Supreme Court called a halt to the New
Federalism.2 The Court could have altered the constitutional landscape by
striking down a federal criminal statute3 prohibiting marijuana as part of a
comprehensive regulation of drugs-when applied to purely intrastate
conduct. State law-the California Compassionate Use Act4-permitted the
conduct. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had invalidated the federal
statute "as applied," 5 relying heavily on two pillars of the New Federalism-
I Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
2 The term "New Federalism" encompasses many issues. Prominent among them are
the following: state sovereignty and immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, see, e.g.,
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); limits on federal ability to "commandeer" the
institutions of state government, see, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997);
and, limits on federal regulatory authority under the enumerated powers of the
Constitution, see, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Raich involves a
variant on the issue present in Lopez-whether federal power to regulate a criminal
matter is lacking, thus leaving the area to the states. For an excellent introduction to the
New Federalism, see Calvin Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS
L.J. 431 (2002). For a critical assessment of the enterprise, particularly the central role of
notions of state sovereignty, see Steven G. Gey, The Myth of State Sovereignty, 63 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1601 (2002).
3 Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2000).
4 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1996).
5 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1228 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Gonzales
v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
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United States v. Lopez6 and United States v. Morrison.7 The appeals court
had also used language central to the debate over federal criminal law: "[I]t is
particularly important that in the field of criminal law enforcement, where
state power is preeminent, national authority be limited to those areas in
which interstate commerce is truly affected .... The police power is,
essentially, reserved to the states .... ." The Supreme Court disagreed,
reversing the Ninth Circuit by a margin of six to three.9 It emphasized the
supremacy of federal law, and the ability of valid regulations of interstate
commerce to reach broadly into intrastate activity. Raich was a
straightforward case that could be answered on the basis of "[w]ell-settled
law.", 0
Noticeably absent from Justice Stevens' majority opinion were any
references to federalism in general, or to such specific staples of New
Federalism rhetoric as state sovereignty, spheres of state authority, the
special status of criminal law enforcement as a state function, or the need to
confine the national government in order to assure some form of balance.
Instead, Justice Stevens treated the case as presenting a classic Commerce
Clause problem. I I He relied heavily on Wickard v. Filburn,12 a problem case
for many conservatives. 13
It is in the dissents of Justices O'Connor and Thomas 14 that one finds
sharp, almost anguished, invocations of federalism themes. They saw Lopez
and Morrison as pushed to the margins of constitutional analysis, reduced to
little more than drafting guides. 15 The beast that had been slain in those
cases-the contention that, because everything is somehow connected to
commerce at some level of abstraction, this interconnectedness permits use
of the Commerce Clause to regulate everything-had reared its head again.'
6
6 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
7 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
8 Raich, 352 F.3d at 1234 (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618).
9 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
10 Id. at 2201.
"1 Id. at 2198-99.
12 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
13 United States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225, 231-33 (5th Cir. 2000) (Jolly, J.,
dissenting); see Brief for Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 12-13, Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003) (No. 03-1454).
14 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2220 (O'Connor, J., and Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at
2229 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
15 Id. at 2223 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
16 Id. at 2225; id. at 2235-37 (Thomas, J., dissenting). For an example of this
reasoning, see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 620-25 (1995) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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For them, the rejection of such reasoning is central to whatever one might
mean by a New Federalism. This Article will refer to this position as the
nonattenuation or noninfinity principle. Lopez and Morrison are -good
examples of the principle at work. It was in part because highly attenuated
arguments of interconnectedness were key to justifying the Gun Free School
Zones Act and the Violence Against Women Act that the Court struck down
these statutes. 17
In Raich itself, the validity of the general federal law at issue in the
case-the Controlled Substances Act and its regulation of the interstate
market in drugs-was conceded by all parties. 18 What was at issue was how
far that law could extend to intrastate possession of a particular drug-
marijuana. This is a far different matter from the question in Lopez and
Morrison, where any form of federal regulation was challenged. Another
factor distinguishing Raich from other federal criminal law cases was the
presence of a state law permitting what federal law prohibited. 19 In most
contexts, federal and state law are essentially parallel in forbidding the same
sort of conduct.20 Joint enforcement efforts often occur. 21 Not so here. The
California Compassionate Use Act permitted limited use of drugs upon a
doctor's recommendation. 22 The fact that federal law said otherwise was
apparently irrelevant. As discussed at greater length below, 23 I do not think
that forbidding such a state override of federal law is a serious setback to the
attempt to find balance in American Federalism. The Supremacy Clause
makes clear that even concurrent regulation is not an undertaking among
equals.24
17 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612-616 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-67; see Craig M.
Bradley, Federalism and the Federal Criminal Law, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 573, 578 (2004)
(referring to the "non-infinity" principle of Lopez).
18 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2204 (2005).
19 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1996).
20 Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg, Federal Power and Federalism: A Theory of
Commerce-Clause Based Regulation of Traditionally State Crimes, 47 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 921, 963 (1997).
21 Daniel C. Richman, "Project Exile" and the Allocation of Federal Law
Enforcement Authority, 43 AIuz. L. REv. 369, 370 (2001); Litman & Greenberg, supra
note 20, at 963.
22 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § I 1362.5(b)(1)(A) (West 1996).
23 See infra Part III.A-B.
24 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; cf New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159
(1992) (explaining that "the Supremacy Clause gives the Federal Government 'a decided
advantage in th[e] delicate balance' the Constitution strikes between state and federal
power").
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In order to get a general perspective of where the New Federalism stands
after Raich, it is necessary to examine in detail the several opinions in the
case with an eye to the important doctrinal battle being waged. This Article
gives more space to the dissents than would normally be the case.25 They
represent an initial New Federalist critique of Raich, as well as a glimpse at
what might have been. What emerges from this examination is the
conclusion that a counterrevolution did not occur. 26 Raich is a setback for the
New Federalism, but it is not a rollback to some form of Lopez-Lite or to the
nonfederalism of Justices Breyer and Souter.27 This Article also uses Raich
as a springboard to discuss several issues within the overall federal criminal
law debate. The first is the current state of the debate itself, and which vision
of federal criminal law and its relation to state law is furthered by the
decision.28 A second issue is how challenges to particular federal criminal
laws can be mounted. 29 The Article considers the hotly contested question of
whether courts may consider as-applied challenges to federal statutes
regulating broad classes of activity. It concludes that Raich correctly
validates such challenges. 30 The Article next deals with the role of
jurisdictional elements-provisions of a statute that require the government
to prove a link between the conduct at issue and the federal power invoked.
31
Jurisdictional elements present serious problems and can easily permit an end
run around the Court's efforts to cabin national power. They are likely to be
the next battleground in federal criminal law. Finally, as a way of tying these
questions together, the Article examines the outer reaches of federal law
through consideration of the current circuit conflict over federal power to ban
child pornography. 32 These cases raise issues of the possibility of as-applied
challenges to federal statutes, the Commerce Clause reach of the latter into
"purely intrastate, private" conduct, and the role of jurisdictional elements. It
is highly significant that three weeks after Raich, the Supreme Court vacated
and remanded to the Eleventh Circuit, for consideration in light of Raich, a
judgment invalidating a federal child pornography statute as applied.33 The
outer reaches may indeed be expansive.
25 See infra Part II.D-E.
26 See infra Part V.
27 See infra Part III.
28 See infra Part III.A-B.
29 See infra Part IV.A-C.
30 See infra Part 1V.D.
31 See infra Part IV.E.
32 See infra Part IV.F.
33 United States v. Smith, 402 F.3d 1303 (1 1th Cir. 2005), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2938
(2005). The Supreme Court has vacated other decisions for consideration in light of
2005]
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Part II of the Article analyzes the various opinions in Raich, both at the
Supreme Court and the circuit court levels.34 Part III considers the impact of
Raich on the New Federalism, and advances the argument that the New
Federalism is alive and well after Raich, particularly if the nonattenuation
principle retains its force.35 Part IV examines the federal criminal law
debate36 and the specific questions alluded to in the previous paragraph.
II. RAICH AND THE LIMITS OF LOPEZ
A. The Ninth Circuit: Pushing the New Federalism Envelope
This Article's analysis of the case begins with the remarkable decision of
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 37 The court invalidated a federal statute
utilizing a mode of analysis purportedly derived from Lopez and Morrison,
took a law regulating an entire class of activities and broke it down into
subclasses, and utilized state law in defining the subclass of activities which
federal law could not reach.38
The case arose out of the clash between two statutes. The Federal
Controlled Substances Act (CSA) bans marijuana as a "Schedule I controlled
substance. 39 Possession of a controlled substance is a criminal offense.40
California, on the other hand, passed in 1996 the Compassionate Use Act.41
The California Act permits use of marijuana for medical purposes when
recommended by a physician.42 A patient or a patient's caregiver, who
possesses or cultivates marijuana for medical treatment upon the
recommendation of a physician, is exempt from state criminal anti-drug
provisions. The two principal plaintiffs utilize marijuana as part of medical
treatment that meets the standards of the Act. One cultivates her own supply;
the other is given marijuana by friends.43 Federal and state officials
Raich: United States v. Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042 (1 1th Cit. 2004), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 321
(2005); Klingler v. Dir., Dep't of Revenue, 366 F.3d 614 (8th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125
S. Ct. 2899 (2005); United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, 125
S. Ct. 2899 (2005).
34 See infra notes 37-193.
35 See infra notes 194-296.
36 See infra notes 297-455.
37 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Gonzales v.
Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
38 Id. at 1228-35.
39 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (1970).
40 Id.
41 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1996).
4 2 Id.
43 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2200 (2005).
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confronted one of the plaintiffs in a "standoff' that led to federal agents
seizing and destroying her six cannabis plants.44 The plaintiffs then brought a
suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the United States
Attorney General and the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Agency.
The specific issue in Raich, as it was brought before the Ninth Circuit,
was whether the plaintiffs had demonstrated a probability of success in their
prayer for preliminary relief, which included a finding of likelihood that the
court would ultimately declare the federal statute unconstitutional as to
them.45 A divided panel found that the "appellants [had] demonstrated a
strong likelihood of success on their claim that, as applied to them, the CSA
is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress'[s] Commerce Clause
authority. '46 The key to the court's analysis was its willingness to treat the
plaintiffs as members of a particular subclass within the broader entity that
the CSA regulates. 47 Indeed, there was substantial circuit precedent to the
effect that the CSA is a valid regulation of commerce.48 Any other
conclusion as to the statute would seem impossible, given the extensive
interstate market in drugs. However, the court was willing to excise the
plaintiffs from that broader class, and defined their subclass in terms of "the
intrastate, noncommercial cultivation, possession and use of marijuana for
personal medical purposes on the advice of a physician and in accordance
with state law."49
The court had, in effect, allowed an as-applied challenge to the CSA on
the part of the class that it had identified and carved out from that statute. It
then applied to that class a four-part test of validity, which it purported to
find in Morrison and its refinement of Lopez.50 The first factor was stated as
"whether the statute regulates commerce or any sort of economic
enterprise." 51 The court concluded that the cultivation and possession of
marijuana under the circumstances presented could not be characterized as
44Id.
45 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Gonzales
v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
4 6 Id.
47 Id. at 1228.
48 See United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1479-80 (9th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Tisor, 96 F.3d 370, 375 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Kim, 94 F.3d 1247,
1249-50 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Visman, 919 F.2d 1390, 1393 (9th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Montes-Zarate, 552 F.2d 1330, 1331 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Rodriquez-Camacho, 468 F.2d 1220, 1221-22 (9th Cir. 1972).
4 9 Raich, 352 F.3d at 1229.
50 Id.
51 Id.
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commercial or economic activity. It found dispositive the lack of any sale,
exchange, or distribution.52 The government attempted to invoke Wickard v.
Filburn53 in order to utilize its aggregation principle, but the court found that
the noncommercial nature of the activity precluded any such application of
Wickard.54 In particular, the Ninth Circuit viewed the marijuana at issue not
as a fungible commodity, "as its use is personal and the appellants do not
seek to exchange it or to acquire marijuana from others in a market. '55 The
court then turned to the second factor: whether the statute contained any
"'express jurisdictional element that might limit its reach to a discrete set' of
cases." 56 The lack of a jurisdictional element in the CSA cut in the plaintiffs'
favor. 57 As for the third factor-legislative findings-the Ninth Circuit noted
that Congress had made findings in the Act itself, including a reference to
local possession of controlled substances. 58 Still, the court emphasized the
lack of any direct finding on marijuana, much less intrastate medicinal use of
marijuana.59 It also diluted the weight of the third factor by stating that
"Morrison counsels courts to take congressional findings with a grain of
salt." 60
Finally, the court turned to the fourth factor of the test that it had found
in Morrison: "whether the link between the regulated activity and a
substantial effect on interstate commerce is 'attenuated.' ' 61 Lopez,
Morrison's predecessor, had dealt with a different problem.62 At issue was
not the possible bearing of the nonattenuation principle on the extent of
Congress's ability to regulate an activity over which it clearly had power.
Rather, the question was whether a general concern like the quality of the
educational system could be invoked to justify regulation of a specific
activity such as gun possession in school zones. Raich did present the first
52 Id. at 1229-30.
53 Id. at 1230.
54 Id. at 1230-31.
55 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1231 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Gonzales
v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). The court had earlier acknowledged the existence of an
interstate market in drug trafficking. Id. at 1228.
56 Id. at 1229.
57 Id. at 1231.
58 Id. at 1232 (finding "local distribution and possession of controlled substances
contribute to swelling the interstate traffic in such substances").59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1233 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Gonzales
v. Raich, 125 S Ct. 2195 (2005).
62 See infra notes 114-18.
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issue, and the court found the plaintiffs' conduct to be remote from the
statute's regulatory ambit.63 In sum, the weighing of the four factors led the
Ninth Circuit to conclude that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail. 64 It also
emphasized the fact that the field of criminal law was in issue, a field "where
state power is preeminent. 65
The court of appeals departed from the pattern of virtually all lower
courts that have navigated around Lopez to find federal criminal statutes
valid.66 Instead, it found in Morrison the four-part test for evaluating the
constitutionality of a federal statute. While it is true that both Lopez and
Morrison mentioned these factors prominently, neither presented them as a
test to be applied mechanically to determine the question of a statute's
validity.67 Of course, before the circuit court could apply any such test to the
plaintiffs' claim, it had to treat them as members of a separate and distinct
63 Raich, 352 F.3d at 1233.
64 Id. at 1234.
65 Id. (quoting United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003)). Also,
it should be noted that, in addition to the role that state law played in defining the class
viewed as relevant by the court, the majority opinion brought the presence of state law
into the case again, in listing the desirability of state experiments as one of the "public
interest" factors that should be considered in an injunctive proceeding. Id. at 1235.
Judge Beam, in a prescient dissent, viewed the case as a straightforward application
of Wickard. Id. at 1235 (Beam, J., dissenting). He noted that the farmer in Wickard would
have been held subject to federal regulation even if his conduct was viewed as
noneconomic. Having made the inevitable comparison between the case before the court
and the situation in Wickard, Judge Beam, admitting his own "redundancy," applied the
four Morrison factors. Unlike the majority, he found the statute valid as applied. Id. at
1240. He viewed the activity as economic in that the marijuana grown was fungible and
might be sold in the marketplace, and that plaintiffs' reliance on it precluded their
recourse to other products in the market. He also viewed regulation of intrastate
possession as "essential to reaching the larger commercial activity" that Congress was
validly regulating. Id. He admitted the lack of a jurisdictional element, viewed the
findings as adequate, and essentially repeated his commercial arguments in the context of
the fourth factor-the presence of an attenuated connection. Id. at 1241-43. Thus, both
the "test" and Wickard led to different conclusions on the ultimate question: whether the
activities of the plaintiffs, and those similarly situated, could be said to have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce-the touchstone for validity under Lopez. United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 554-59 (1995).
66 See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 17, at 575; id. at 603-05 (noting limited impact of
Lopez on lower court decisions).
67 Morrison perhaps goes further, presenting the factors as "significant
considerations [that] contributed to our decision." United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 609 (2000). The Morrison majority also stated that in considering questions of
substantial effect on commerce, Lopez "provides the proper framework for conducting
the required analysis of [the statute in question]." Id.
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subclass, different from the general class that was validly regulated by the
CSA. There is certainly no authority in Lopez and Morrison for this major
analytical step: disaggregating a legislative class. Those cases did not even
involve the problem.68
Let us assume, for now, that an as-applied challenge is possible. It is far
from clear that the four-part test is much help. For example, reading Lopez
and Morrison as preferring a jurisdictional element does not seem to add
much to the analysis. Some justices have apparently expressed a preference
for statutes with a jurisdictional element, such as a requirement that the
defendant's conduct have an effect on commerce. 69 Such elements both
narrow the field of regulation and link particular cases to congressional
power. However, Lopez was careful to accept and endorse the existing body
of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, which includes major class-of-activity
statutes, that is, those that do not require any individualized showing through
a jurisdictional element. 70 Famous examples of cases upholding such statutes
are Wickard and Perez v. United States.71 Lopez would indeed have been a
constitutional revolution if it cast serious doubt on class-of-activity statutes.
The Ninth Circuit in Raich was correct in identifying the
economic/commercial nature of a regulation as central to any Lopez-based
inquiry as to its validity. The CSA passes that test, given the highly
developed interstate market in drugs. The question, again, is whether the
general regulated class can be somehow disaggregated to focus on those who
do not participate in any discernible way in that market. In addition, one
should flag the circuit's use of state law in carving out the class. 72 The
definition of the class, with its basis in state law, raises the troubling question
of whether states can play a role in establishing the validity of federal
regulation. The Supremacy Clause73 dictates otherwise. Finally, there is the
suggestion that the fact that the statute regulates "'the field of criminal law
enforcement, where state power is preeminent' should play a separate role
68 At issue was the basic constitutionality of the statutes involved, not their
application to particular groups.
69 See generally text accompanying notes 372-417 infra (discussing current status of
jurisdictional elements).
70 See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
71 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942).
72 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1228 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Gonzales
v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (defining the class as "the intrastate, noncommercial
cultivation and possession of cannabis for personal medical purposes as recommended by
a patient's physician pursuant to valid California state law").
73 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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in analyzing the statute's validity. 74 To accept this proposition would be a
major step toward a strong version of the New Federalism.
B. Raich-An Easy Case
In Raich, Justice Stevens wrote the Supreme Court's opinion reversing
the decision below.75 He was joined by four justices. Justice Scalia joined the
decision, but not the majority opinion. Like the circuit court, Justice Stevens
began with Lopez76 as the analytical starting point for any Commerce Clause
analysis of a challenged federal statute. However; that is virtually the only
resemblance between his opinion and that of the court below. He viewed the
matter as one of "well-settled law."'77 That law is the body of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence that Lopez (and Morrison) had maintained. Justice
Stevens did not present those cases as departing from that body of law
through the formulation of any new federalism-based "test," against which to
measure the validity of congressional statutes. Indeed, the opinion is
noteworthy for its virtual lack of any reference to federalism. What he found
present in Raich was the classic Commerce Clause issue of federal power to
"regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic 'class of
activities' that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 78
Justice Stevens presented Lopez as the starting point for analysis, 79 but
the central case in his Commerce Clause discussion was Wickard.80 Wickard
was quoted initially for the proposition that "'even if appellee's activity be
local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever
its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect
on interstate commerce."'' 81 Justice Stevens used this analysis to repeat the
Court's openness to congressional legislation that regulates an entire class of
activities. 82 Having raised the class-of-activities issue, Justice Stevens then
turned to the question of whether as-applied challenges are available in the
74 Raich, 352 F.3d at 1234 (quoting United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1124
(9th Cir. 2003)).
75 See generally Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
76 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
77 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2201.
78 Id. at 2205.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 2205-15. Cites to Wickard proliferate throughout this analysis. E.g., id. at
2205-10.
81 Id. at 2205-06 (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942)).
82 Id. at 2206.
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case of such statutes. He repeated the famous quote from Maryland v. Wirtz8 3
to the effect that when "a general regulatory statute bears a substantial
relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising
under that statute is of no consequence." 84
Nonetheless, he proceeded to perform a Wickard-driven analysis of the
CSA in the context of the Raich challenge. He treated the challengers as
analogous to the farmer cultivating wheat, 85 even though one of the plaintiffs
did not grow her own marijuana. For Justice Stevens, the marijuana, like the
wheat in the earlier case, could seep into the interstate market. 86 Using the
"rational basis" test that had been applied in Lopez to give judicial review
some teeth,87 he stated that, as in Wickard, there is "no difficulty" 88 in
concluding that "Congress had a rational basis for concluding that leaving
home-consumed marijuana outside federal control would similarly affect
price and market conditions." 89 Thus, the requirement of a substantial effect
on interstate commerce-the third category of congressional authority
recognized in Lopez9 0-was satisfied.91
As with Wickard itself, there is a certain ambiguity as to whether the
marijuana was at least a potential part of the interstate market that Congress
could easily regulate under the Commerce Clause, or whether leaving it for
"home" cultivation and consumption represented an instance where
noncommercial activities might undercut regulation of an interstate market.92
Either way, there would be a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Justice Stevens did not place major reliance on the argument that the
plaintiffs, like the farmer in Wickard who might have bought his wheat in the
interstate market if he did not grow his own, might have recourse to the
interstate market.93 Overall, Wickard seems relevant for three particular
propositions: (1) the possibility of diversion into the interstate market; (2) the
83 Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
84 Id. at 196 n.27.
85 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2206-07 (2005).
86 Id. at 2207.
87 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 554 (1995).
88 Raich,' 125 S. Ct. at 2207.
89 Id.
90 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
91 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2208-09 (2005).
92 See, e.g., id. at 2206-07. The fact that the regulation was a ban also brings the two
arguments closer together. Justice Stevens stated that "[w]hen Congress decides that the
'total incidence' of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the
entire class." Id. at 2206.
93 He noted the possibility in'a footnote. Id. at 2207 n.28.
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risk of undercutting federal regulations; and (3) the possibility of aggregating
the instances of admittedly local activity to the point at which they have an
impact on interstate commerice. 94
Justice Stevens went on to explain why Lopez and Morrison did not
support the plaintiffs' challenge to the CSA, and to refute point-by-point
their as-applied critique.95 As for Lopez and Morrison, he criticized the
plaintiffs for reading those cases "far too broadly." 96 Furthermore, they
presented statutory challenges quite different from those in Raich. Neither
was an as-applied challenge to a "concededly valid statutory scheme. '" 97
Rather, the facial challenge was whether the statute fell outside of
congressional power under the Commerce Clause. 98 The main defect of the
statute in Lopez (the Gun-Free School Zones Act)99 was that it did not
regulate economic activity or represent an essential part of a larger regulation
of economic activity, "'in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut
unless the intrastate activity were regulated.' 100 The CSA, by contrast, is a
classic general regulation of an. admittedly economic problem. 1 1 Justice
Stevens stated that it is an example of a federal law that regulates
94 See Raich, 125 S. Ct: at 2207 (stating that production of a commodity for home
consumption has a substantial effect on supply and demand in the national market). Id. at
2209 (finding a "rational basis for believing that failure to regulate the intrastate
manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a gaping hole in the CSA"). This
portion of the opinion closed with another strong suggestion that the as-applied challenge
could not have been brought in the first place. Having previously stated that "[w]e have
never required Congress to legislate with scientific exactitude," Justice Stevens
concluded his analysis with the statement "[tihat the regulation ensnares some purely
intrastate activity is of no moment. As we have done many times before, we refuse to
excise individual components of that larger scheme." Id. at 2206, 2209.
95 Id. at 2209-15.
96 Id. at 2209.
97 Id.
98 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 590, 604-05 (2000); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
99 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209.
100 Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
101 Morrison was of no greater help to the plaintiffs. Justice Stevens stated that:
[L]ike the statute in Lopez, it did not regulate economic activity. We concluded
that 'the noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue was central to our
decision' in Lopez, and that our prior cases had identified a clear pattern of analysis:
'where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation
regulating that activity will be sustained.'
Id. at 2210 (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610) (alteration'in original).
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"quintessentially economic" activities.10 2 The fact that it is, partially, a ban
made no difference: "Prohibiting the intrastate possession or manufacture of
an article of commerce is a rational (and commonly utilized) means of
regulating commerce in that product." 0 3
Justice Stevens went beyond contrasting the statutory backgrounds and
proceeded to rebut the other components of the as-applied challenge. 104 He
reserved his strongest language for the proposition that state law could
somehow set the class apart from intrastate possessors in general.'0 5 In part,
he saw this argument as a direct challenge to federal supremacy, clearly
invalid given that "[t]he Supremacy Clause unambiguously provides that if
there is any conflict between federal and state law, federal law shall
prevail."'1 06 The possibility of any such contention gave him the opportunity
to accuse Justice Thomas, one of the dissenters, of attempting to "turn the
Supremacy Clause on its head .... -107 Plaintiffs apparently did not utilize
state law to exempt themselves from the general federal regulation, but to
argue that those who complied with the Compassionate Use Act presented no
danger of the seeping-into-the-market sort that Justice Stevens had
hypothesized in applying Wickard.'0 8 Their contention was that the "legal"
usage would be tightly controlled: "a discrete activity that is hermetically
sealed off from the larger interstate... market. ."109 He found this
proposition one that Congress could have rationally rejected, and went to
102 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 2211 (2005).
103 Id. (footnote omitted).
104 The key to any such challenge was the definition of the relevant class of
activities by the Ninth Circuit as "'the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation, possession
and use of marijuana for personal medical purposes on the advice of a physician and in
accordance with state law."' Id. (quoting Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1229 (9th
Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005)). The first
component, that the use was for personal medical purposes on advice of a physician,
could not save any such class. For Justice Stevens, Congress had considered possible
medical uses of marijuana and rejected them. Id. at 2211-12. Thus, this purported aspect
of the class was, in his view, tantamount to saying that personal use, regardless of the
purpose, was an acceptable exemption from the Act. He had little difficulty in treating
any such broad exemption as a fundamental conflict with the purposes of the CSA. Id. at
2212 (stating that "[t]he congressional judgment that an exemption for such a significant
segment of the total market would undermine the orderly enforcement of the entire
regulatory scheme is entitled to a strong presumption of validity").
105 Id. at 2212-15.
106 Id. at 2212.
107 Id. at 2213 n.38.
108 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2213-15 (2005).
109 Id. at 2213.
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some lengths to demonstrate why. 110 In the end, the plaintiffs' only
distinction was that, unlike participants in the interstate market, they engaged
in "'the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation, possession and use of
marijuana. ' ''" Any such contention was foreclosed by the CSA's specific
findings on interstate possession, the large commercial market for marijuana,
and Wickard. 112
Given the importance of Raich, and the likelihood that it will be seen as a
serious setback for the New Federalism as espoused in Lopez and Morrison,
it is worth noting three significant omissions from the majority opinion.
Justice Stevens did not present the issue as one of federalism in the way that
Justice Rehnquist began Lopez in the ringing tones of starting "with first
principles." 1 3 Indeed, there is no discussion of the constitutional vision in
which a construction of the enumerated powers of the national government
serves to enlarge or diminish those of the states. A second omission is any
reference to such staples of the New Federalism as notions of traditional state
authority, spheres in which states play a special role, the lack of a national
police power, or heightened scrutiny when a basically state activity, such as
the criminal law, is at issue.114 Finally, there is no invocation of the
nonattenuation principle, or even a reference 'to the role that it played in
Lopez and Morrison. In Morrison, for example, Chief Justice Rehnquist
referred to Lopez's rejection of a "but-for reasoning" under which
"'Congress could regulate any activity that it found was related to the
economic productivity of individual citizens: family law (including marriage,
divorce, and child custody)." ' 115 He went on to base his rejection of such
attenuated chains of causation on the ground that "'it is difficult to perceive
any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law
enforcement or education, where States historically have been sovereign."'116
This reasoning played a central role in both Lopez and Morrison, cases which
Justice Stevens treated as good law.l17 The omission of any such reference is
110 He viewed the medical exemption as likely to increase the supply of marijuana in
the California market and foresaw a danger that unscrupulous users would take advantage
of it. Id. at 2214.
111 Id. at 2215 (citing Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1229 (9th Cir. 2003)).
112 Id.
113 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
114 See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2222 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611-19 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 572 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
115 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564).
116 Id. (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564).
117 See, e.g., Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209-11.
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surprising. It is perhaps even more surprising given the fact that the lower
court had invoked the nonattenuation principle in arguing that the plaintiffs'
marijuana had no connection to the market." 18
C. Justice Scalia: A New Federalist Concurs
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, in an opinion he stylized as
"more nuanced." 119 His-vote is important both because it produced a more
solid-looking six-three alignment, and because he was in the majority in
Lopez and Morrison. Without his support, any attempt to extend those cases
was doomed from the outset. It is not clear that Justice Scalia adds
substantially to the Stevens analysis. His difference with the majority, if any,
seems primarily methodological. Cases had routinely referred to the
"substantially affect[ing] interstate commerce" 120 category as one of the
basic concepts permitting congressional regulation. However, Justice Scalia
viewed the category as misleading. He argued that rules governing activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce, but are not themselves part of
interstate commerce, cannot derive their authority from the Commerce
Clause. 121 Rather, once Congress goes beyond regulation of commercial
activities, it is deriving its power from the Necessary and.Proper Clause. 122
Thus, in a given case, we might find Congress devising rules either for the
governance of commerce or to facilitate it by eliminating obstructions. 123
Justice Scalia derived support for this distinction from Lopez and Morrison
themselves. 24 However, he read the cases as imposing a further distinction.
If the conduct in question is economic, Congress may regulate it if that
conduct substantially affects interstate commerce. 125 On the other hand,
Congress may regulate "noneconomic local activity if that regulation is a
necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce."12 6
118 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1233 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Gonzales
v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
119 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215 (Scalia, J., concurring).
120 E.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608-09 (2000).
121 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2215-16 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).
122 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215-16.
123 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2216.
124 Id.
125 See id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995); United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000)).
12 6 Id. at 2217. As an illustration, Justice Scalia cited United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941), in which Congress both excluded from commerce goods that were made
in violation of federal standards, and also required employers to keep records to
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At least two reservations about Justice Scalia's general doctrinal
framework should be noted. In drawing the line between regulation of
economic and noneconomic activity, 127 he appears to be saying that the latter
cannot be sustained under any notion of "substantial effects." Rather, the
question is whether the noneconomic activity "undercut[s]'128 the regulatory
scheme. As later discussion of the Hobbs Act 129 will show, there may well be
instances of noneconomic activity with a substantial effect on commerce that
do not harm a regulatory scheme. It is possible to draw such distinctions too
finely. Second, applying a distinction between substantial effect and
undercutting regulation is hard to do in the context of cases like Wickard and
Raich. The commodities in question-wheat and marijuana-are closely
related to the interstate market and potentially part of it. Moreover, the
"regulation" is in the form of a ban. Does it make more sense to say that Ms.
Raich was potentially a market participant, and thus could be regulated as
part of it, or that somehow her consumption undercut the broader federal
regulation? Although Justice Scalia attempted to draw the line sharply
between these two forms of legislation, his application of it to the facts of the
case blurred the issue. He followed closely Justice Stevens in explaining that
marijuana is a fungible commodity and that the drugs in possession of
individuals like Raich could easily find their way into the market.
130
Nonetheless, his summation of his views stated that "Congress could
reasonably conclude that its objective of prohibiting marijuana from the
interstate market 'could be undercut' if those activities were excepted from
its general scheme of regulation." 131
demonstrate compliance. The first part of the scheme could be viewed as an example of
regulating an economic activity with a substantial effect on interstate commerce, while
the record-keeping requirement is an example of a noneconomic activity regulated under
the Necessary and Proper Clause to further the aims of the economic regulation. Raich,
125 S. Ct. at 2217-18 (Scalia, J., concurring).
127 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2217 (2005).
128 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
129 See infra notes 333-34, 373-90.
130 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2219.
131 Id. at 2220 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)). The
differences between the two approaches seem slight, despite Justice Scalia's emphasis on
interference with federal regulation and Justices Stevens's emphasis on activities that can
be aggregated to produce a substantial effect on commerce. He too stresses the risk of a
gap that would "undercut" or "frustrate" the regulatory scheme, as well as the risk of a
"gaping hole in the CSA." Id. at 2206, 2207, 2209 (majority opinion). Both focus on the
fact that the marijuana might enter the interstate market-in Justice Scalia's words,
"marijuana that is grown at home and possessed for personal use is never more than an
instant from the interstate market." Id. at 2219 (Scalia, J., concurring). This is a result that
Congress can forbid as part of the CSA. The drug's entrance into the market would
certainly have an effect on that market. The presence of more drugs for law enforcement
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Justice Scalia did sound some New Federalism themes absent from the
majority opinion. He paid homage to "the line between 'what is truly national
and what is truly local.""' 132 He also affirmed not only the validity of Lopez
and Morrison but also the nonattenuation principle expressed therein.133
However, he found no inconsistency with these cases. Upholding the
regulation of intrastate activity in Raich was permissible because Congress
had set in place a valid scheme of regulating interstate activity. 134 Whether
such a scheme existed at all was the central issue on which the Court divided
in Lopez and Morrison.135 Once such a scheme is in place, as in the case of
the CSA, Lopez and Morrison do not prevent regulation of intrastate
noneconomic activity to protect it. Like Justice Stevens, Justice Scalia gave
no weight to the existence of a-contrary state statutory approach, despite the
fact that the area was one "typically left to state regulation."'136 Thus, on the
key issues in Raich, the New Federalism seemed to have no impact on
Justice Scalia's opinion. 137
D. Justice O'Connor's Dissent-New Federalism Abandoned?
Justice O'Connor (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist) authored a strong
dissent 138 that treated the decision as a betrayal of the New Federalism,
particularly insofar as that general approach's precepts were embodied in
Lopez and Morrison. Her opinion contains many of the formulations that
have been integral portions of the Court's recent decisions arguing for a
strengthened state role. She began by stating that "[w]e enforce the 'outer
limits' of Congress' [s] Commerce Clause authority not for their own sake,
but to protect historic spheres of state sovereignty from excessive federal
encroachment and thereby to maintain the distribution of power fundamental
to deal with, as well as the difficulty of distinguishing between intrastate and interstate
marijuana, could also interfere with the federal regulatory goal of interdicting marijuana
by making that goal harder to accomplish. It may be that stating the problem as one of
what is necessary and proper leads to a focus on undercutting a regulation, while viewing
the market as a single entity leads to a focus on the need to regulate all facets of it.
132 Id. at 2218 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68); see also
id. at 2216.
133 Id. at 2216-17.
134 Id. 2219-20.
135 See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
136 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2220 (2005).
137 As to the validity of the regulation, Justice Scalia did seem to require that the
regulation be reasonable, as opposed to requiring a mere rational basis. Id.138 Id.
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to our federalist system of government."' 139 She also made reference to "dual
sovereignty,"'140 the dangers of a "federal police power,"' 141 and the historic
and special role of the states in "areas of criminal law and social policy."'
142
She placed special emphasis on the role of the states as "laboratories" for
innovative policies,143 one of the classic and most frequently invoked
arguments for a vigorous federalism. 144 Indeed, the importance of the state
role as laboratories is present in both the first and last paragraphs of her
opinion, and plays a role in her doctrinal argument that the content of state
law carries substantial weight in a case like Raich, which "involves the
interplay of federal and state regulation .... 145
However, the heart of her analysis was devoted to Lopez and Morrison
and her view that they are "materially indistinguishable"' 146 from Raich, and
"irreconcilable" with the Court's decision.' 47 Although stopping short of the
widespread notion in courts of appeals that Lopez or Morrison contained a
four-part "test," she stated that the former case "turned on"148 four
considerations. The first was that "substantial effects" cases have generally
upheld regulation of economic activity that affected interstate commerce, but
that the criminal statute in Lopez had "nothing to do with 'commerce' or any
sort of economic enterprise."'149 The case also noted the lack of a
jurisdictional element, and the lack of legislative findings. 150 Finally, Lopez
contained the nonattenuation principle, 151 specifically, rejection of the
139 Id.
140 Id. at 2224. She also invoked "state autonomy." Id.
141 Id. at 2225.
142 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2224 (2005).
143 Id. at 2221.
144 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated
Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 752, 776-77; John 0.
McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence of
Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REv. 485, 519 (2002). Calabresi points to "an incentive for
state governments to experiment and improve." Calabresi, supra, at 777. The benefits are
twofold: potentially better services in individual states and models for other states to
follow. Id.
145 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2224.
146 Id. at 2222.
147 Id. at 2221.
148 Id.; United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
149 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2221 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)); see id. at 2222 (stating that
the Court relied on the same four considerations in Morrison).
150 Id. at 2221-22.
151 See also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-12.
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argument "that firearm possession in school zones could result in violent
crime, which, in turn, could adversely affect the national economy."' 152
The key to her analysis was whether the conduct to be considered was
that of the plaintiffs, or the entire field regulated by the CSA. 153 She
expressed great concern that the Court was encouraging Congress to use
general statutes to mask regulation of intrastate activity. 154 Thus, Lopez had
been reduced to "nothing more than a drafting guide."'155 She argued that in
the case of the statute at issue in Lopez, Congress might as easily have
described the crime as "transfer or possession of a firearm anywhere in the
nation,"156 thus encompassing a broad range of activities, some of which
would have the necessary substantial effect, and which would include the
possession of guns in school zones.
She addressed the appropriateness of an as-applied challenge, noted the
Court's expressed preference for such challenges, and proceeded to consider
the definition of the relevant class. 157 For her, state law played a role both in
defining the relevant class and in giving it a presumptive status of validity. In
general, Justice O'Connor argued that situations like Raich call for a
balancing test that "depends on the regulatory scheme at issue and the
federalism concerns implicated."' 58 Because of the high deference that
should be accorded to state actions in areas of criminal and social policy, the
burden lies with the federal government to justify its regulation in such
situations. 159 For Justice O'Connor, "a concern for dual sovereignty requires
that Congress' [s] excursion into the traditional domain of States be
justified.' 160 After noting the role of state law in permitting medical use, she
defined the class as individuals engaged in "the personal cultivation,
possession, and use of marijuana for medicinal purposes."'161 She expressed
strong doubt that such activity could be labeled as economic or
commercial. 162 For Justice O'Connor, examining whether regulating
intrastate activity somehow furthered the interstate scheme of the CSA was
subject to the same burden on the part of the federal government, even if the
152 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2222.
153 Id. at 2222-23.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 2223.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 2223-24 (2005).
158 Gonzalez v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2223 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
159 Id. at 2226.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 2224.
162 Id. at 2225.
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Necessary and Proper Clause came into play. 163 Here again, principles of
state sovereignty played an important role in a negative answer.
Justice O'Connor's opinion is noteworthy for the extent to which she
was willing to have the Court engage in judicial consideration of the issue of
the intrastate dimensions of marijuana. She distinguished Wickard on the
grounds that it contained an extensive record developed in the litigation
itself.164 As for intrastate possession under the CSA, Justice O'Connor
concluded that Congress had not made relevant findings, in particular,
findings that dealt with marijuana.' 65 She viewed the "findings" in the CSA
that dealt with local manifestations of drug-related issues as nothing more
than "declarations."' 166 She left open the possibility that the government
could make an argument that the intrastate activities had an effect on or
constituted an interference with the federal statute, but found that in the
actual litigation the presumption created by state action had not been
overcome. 167
Justice O'Connor is certainly right in emphasizing the problems that
arise in as-applied challenges to statutes. that regulate a concededly interstate
problem, such as the drug market. However, it is unrealistic to assume that
Congress would pass broad statutes primarily for the purpose of reaching a
narrow and discrete set of intrastate activities. For example, it is highly
unlikely that Congress would pass a statute prohibiting "transfer or
possession of a firearm anywhere in the nation" in order to get at guns in
school zones. The political difficulties that are obvious in trying to pass any
such broad statute inevitably lead toward attempts at the narrow one,
attempts of the sort foiled in Lopez. 168 National power would be expanded
greatly if the Court examined intrastate effects without reference to a general
statute, or did not even require the existence of one. Again, neither step
seems likely, although Justice O'Connor is right in noting the analytical
difficulties present.' 69 The reviewing court has to be mindful at all times of
the relationship between the challenging class and the broadly regulated area.
163 Id. at 2226.
164 Gonzalez v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2227 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She
also distinguished it on the ground that the relevant statute had exempted some small
producers. Id. at 2225.
165 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2227-28.
166 Id. at 2227.
167 Id.
168 See id. at 2210 n.34 (majority opinion).
169 She referred to "the problem endemic to the Court's opinion-the shift in focus
from the activity at issue in this case to the entirety of what the CSA regulates." Id. at
2224.
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On the more fundamental issue of the consistency of Raich with Lopez
and Morrison, Justice O'Connor ignored the difference in statutory context
that she elsewhere discussed at length. 170 Those cases were "on their face"
challenges to statutes that the Court held beyond Congress's power to enact
at all. The majority in each case found no substantial effect on interstate
commerce. 171 In Raich, on the other hand, there was a valid regulation of
commerce. 172 Nothing in Lopez or Morrison casts doubt on the CSA. The
question in Raich was how to analyze the as-applied challenge in light of the
larger statute. It is difficult to excise the intrastate conduct and attempt to
measure its effect on commerce separately from the effect of the entire
regulated class. Markets, including potential parts thereof, may not lend
themselves to disaggregation for legal analysis. Placing the burden of
justification on the federal government, Justice O'Connor appeared to answer
the substantial effects question 173 with insufficient concern for the CSA and
its goal of banning interstate trafficking in marijuana. It seems, as the
majority argued, a serious misreading of Lopez and Morrison to approach
valid class-of-activity statutes in this manner. 174
Particularly problematic is the role of state law. There is no mention in
Justice O'Connor's opinion of the Supremacy Clause. Her analysis seems to
be that congressional and state statutes are arrayed against each other on a
playing field which varies, in terms of relative advantage, with the nature of
the subject matter and the degree to which the subject matter looks more
"state" or more "federal." One might have reservations about giving this
much weight to any state law when a conflict with federal law is present.
These reservations ought to extend to the possibility of a judicial examination
of whether the operation of the state law seals off the relevant class from the
interstate market and, thereby, makes the federal law unnecessary as to that
class. More fundamental, however, is the question of whether the decision
that the federal statute is valid totally precludes any inquiries along these
lines given the basic principle embodied in the Supremacy Clause.
170 Id. at 2221-24.
171 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612-13 (2000); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
172 Gonzalez v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2204 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
173 Id. at 2225-26.
174 Id.at 2209-11 (majority opinion).
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E. Justice Thomas and the Role of State Law Within Necessary and
Proper Analysis
Like Justice O'Connor, Justice Thomas sounded many New Federalism
themes, in particular, the danger that the federal government could become
"no longer one of limited and enumerated powers."'175 After concluding that
plaintiffs' conduct did not represent interstate commerce under either his
definition or that of the majority, 176 he examined what he regarded as the
more difficult question of whether regulation of their intrastate conduct
might still be justified under the Necessary and Proper, Clause. 177
Surprisingly, he concluded that, looked at on its face, the intrastate ban on
cultivation, possession, and distribution could be "plainly adapted to stopping
the interstate flow of marijuana." 178 In this respect, he appeared to accept the
majority's reasoning about marijuana's potential entry into the market, thus
making it more difficult to regulate. However, for Justice Thomas, the fact
that the plaintiffs challenged the CSA as applied to their conduct, instead of
on its face, was determinative. 179
He saw state law as playing a crucial role in determining the class whose
challenge was before the Court: "local growers and users of state-authorized,
medical marijuana."'180 He also devoted considerable attention to the "strict[]
controls"' 181 that California placed upon such users and concluded that the
state statutory scheme probably demonstrated that it was not "necessary" for
the federal government to override it in order to preserve effective regulation
of the interstate marijuana traffic. 182
Even if necessary, the federal scheme-reaching so deeply into state-
regulated intrastate matters-would not be "proper,"' 83 according to Justice
Thomas. In applying the term proper, Justice Thomas focused on the role of
federal law in expanding the powers of Congress to the point of giving it "a
175 Id. at 2229 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
176 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2229-30. Justice Thomas expounded on his definition of
commerce in his separate Lopez opinion. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-87
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
177 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2230-34 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
178 Id. at 2231.
179 Id.
18 0 Id. at 2231 (emphasis added).
181 Id. at 2232 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
182 Id. at 2233.
183 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2233 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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general 'police power' over the Nation." 184 In particular, he expressed grave
concern over the encroachment on states' traditional police powers in the
areas of criminal law, health, safety, and welfare, and explicitly denied
Congress any power to use its "incidental authority to subvert basic
principles of federalism and dual sovereignty."'' 85 Justice Thomas, like
Justice Scalia, also attacked the "substantial effects test," albeit for different
reasons. He argued that it is too malleable. It allows definition of the class at
such a high level of generality-for example, any intrastate possession-that
the test imposes no limits on congressional authority. 186 He also took issue
with the extension of federal power to intrastate noneconomic activity as
inconsistent with recent precedent. 187 He invoked the nonattenuation
principle against the majority, arguing that it was allowing the Commerce
Clause to "reach the entire web of human activity," based on the
interconnectedness of the various aspects of the economic activity that
Congress might wish to reach. 188 The result of such extensive federalization
is to "strip" the states of their authority over conduct such as that in Raich,
since the operation of federal law would prevent state law from having any
say, at least a contrary one. 1 89
In the course of this discussion of his differences with the majority,
Justice Thomas conceded the validity of traditional class-of-activities
analysis and even cited the famous language from Maryland v. Wirtz to the
effect that when a valid class is in existence, individual, de minimis instances
cannot be excised.190 However, he also expressed a preference for as-applied
challenges. 191 In any such challenge, the nature of the class and the manner
in which it is defined are key. Justice Thomas emphasized, once again, the
special characteristics of these plaintiffs and their purported class. 192 As with
Justice O'Connor, state law played the roles of demarcation of the specific
subclass, attempting a potentially important experiment in the difficult,
184 Id.
185 Id. at 2234.
186 Id. at 2235-37.
187 Id. at 2235-36 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000)).
188 Id. at 2236.
189 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2236-37 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
see also id. at 2237 ("One searches the Court's opinion in vain for any hint of what aspect
of American life is reserved to the States.").
190 Id. at 2237.
191 Id. at 2238.
192 Id. at 2237 ("If medical marijuana patients like... Raich largely stand outside
the interstate drug market, then courts must excise them from the CSA's coverage.").
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sometimes intractable, field of drug regulation, 193 and removing a quantity of
marijuana from any possible interstate uses. By focusing on the issue of state
law in the way that they did, the inevitable question about the Raich dissents
(and the Ninth Circuit majority) is whether the dissenters wished to extend
the New Federalism beyond a point which it had previously reached, with
grave implications for national authority.
III. AICH AND THE NEW FEDERALISM
A. Raich as a Setback
There are a number of reasons why Raich might be seen as a setback for
the New Federalism. Perhaps most important is its failure to grant Lopez (and
Morrison) any generative force. Lopez is treated with respect, as establishing
the parameters for considering the general validity of a federal statute under
the substantial effects prong of regulations of commerce. 194 But the analysis
may seem Lopez-Lite in the sense that Lopez's ramifications do not extend
beyond congressional attempts to define a problem as so sufficiently related
to commerce that the federal government has power to deal with it. Raich
presented the proverbial next question of how to deal with the intrastate
dimensions of an admittedly national problem subject to valid federal
regulation. From the point of view of a New Federalism advocate, cases such
as Lopez and Raich might be seen as presenting two issues that are
analytically close: (1) does the national government have the power to deal
with a problem at all; and, (2) if it does, how far does its power reach into the
intrastate manifestations of the problem? For the New Federalist, the second
question is just as important as the first.
I think that the New Federalist critique of Raich has to be taken
seriously. After all, of the twelve appellate judges who passed on the case,
five thought that the CSA was invalid as applied. 195 Granted, the Raich
context is different from that of Lopez and Morrison, but these judges found
in the latter cases principles applicable to the former. Should Justice Stevens
have drawn the economic/commercial line differently, excluding the small-
scale intrastate activity in question? Justice O'Connor criticized him for
analytical confusion: using the admittedly commercial nature of the general
statute as an excuse for jumping to all intrastate manifestations of marijuana
193 Id. at 2232, 2238-39.
1 94 Id. at 2209-10 (majority opinion).
195 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Thomas, of the Supreme
Court; and the two judges in the majority on the Ninth Circuit.
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consumption and production as covered by the CSA's wide net.196 However,
two important points need to be made in defense of Justice Stevens. The first
is that Lopez reaffirmed the notion of a class-of-activities statute from which,
once the statute was held valid, "trivial" excisions should not be made. 197
The second is that Lopez reaffirmed Wickard as well, and Justice Stevens
engaged in a plausible application of that case and its analysis. Like the
wheat in Wickard, "purely intrastate" 198 marijuana "overhangs"' 199 the
market, and, if it entered the market, would have a substantial effect. Perhaps
Justice Stevens can be faulted by defenders of Lopez for applying rational
basis analysis so as not to force Congress to justify its actions more fully.200
This would be a possible departure, at least from the spirit of Lopez, which
suggested a more thorough judicial undertaking. However, it remains the
case that Lopez treated Wickard's analysis of intrastate problems as good
law. 20 1 If Lopez lacks generative force, the fault may well lie in the case
itself, a point made by commentators who have seen it more as a necessary
correction than as a "revolution" in federal-state relations and American
constitutional law.20 2
Another reason Raich might be regarded as a setback for the New
Federalism is the Court's dismissal of any role for state law. California's
Compassionate Use Act would, after all, have created the class of activities
to be analyzed: "the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation, possession and
196 Justice O'Connor stated:
Putting to one side the problem endemic to the Court's opinion-the shift in focus
from the activity at issue in this case to the entirety of what the CSA regulates,
(depending on the level of generality, any activity can be looked upon as
commercial)-the Court's definition of economic activity for purposes of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence threatens to sweep all of productive human activity
into federal regulatory reach.
Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2224 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
197 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz,
392 U.S. 183, 197 n.27 (1968)).
198 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2206.
199 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942).
200 See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2207; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557.
201 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556.
202 Massey, supra note 2, at 479 ("The Court tinkered with existing doctrine rather
than challenging its foundations."). One commentator predicted that Lopez would not
have a significant effect on federal criminal law because of its approval of the
aggregation principle and jurisdictional elements. Andrew St. Laurent, Reconstituting
United States v. Lopez: Another Look at Federal Criminal Law, 31 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 61, 107 (1997).
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use of marijuana for personal medical purposes on the advice of a physician
and in accordance with state law."'203 The majority viewed state law as
irrelevant once federal power was found. The dissenters would have
accorded it an importance far beyond anything suggested in Lopez.
Essentially, they adopted the position of the Ninth Circuit, which concluded
that state law itself rendered inoperative an otherwise valid federal statute. 20 4
California law bestowed the legitimacy of medical use on designated
individuals, 20 5 and thereby removed those individuals from the regulatory
regime of the CSA. In other words, state law played the key role in
identifying and excising a subclass.
Justice Stevens surely was correct in invoking concepts of federal
supremacy to negate the notion of any such role for state law. If federal law
regulating private conduct is valid, the notion that state law purporting to
regulate that same conduct in a diametrically opposed way could insulate it
from the federal regime flies in the face of the scheme established by the
Supremacy Clause.206 Moreover, the uniformity of federal law would also be
seriously undermined. What would happen in states with no compassionate
use scheme? No intrastate subclass of state-law-authorized medical users
could be distinguished, even if there were users exactly like the Raich
plaintiffs. Thus, the general class-of-activities analysis of cases like
Maryland v. Wirtz20 7 and Perez v. United States208 would presumably
prevail.
203 This is the class as defined by the court of appeals. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d
1222, 1229 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added), rev'd sub nom. Gonzales v. Raich, 125
S. Ct. 2195 (2005). Justice O'Connor approved of this definition. See Gonzales v. Raich,
125 S. Ct. 2195, 2224 (2005) (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
204 State law not only played a key role in defining the class. The Ninth Circuit, in
weighing the public interest factors relevant to injunctive relief, stated that "[t]he public
interest of the state of California and its voters in the viability of the Compassionate Use
Act also weighs against the appellees' concerns." Raich, 352 F.3d at 1235.
205 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1996).
206 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.. ."); see
Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2213 (2005) ("[N]o form of state activity can constitutionally thwart
the regulatory power granted by the commerce clause to Congress") (quoting Wickard v.
Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942) (alternation in original)). In response to Justice
Thomas, Justice Stevens stated that "his rationale seemingly would require Congress to
cede its constitutional power to regulate commerce whenever a State opts to exercise its
'traditional police powers to define the criminal law and to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of their citizens."' Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2213 n.38.
207 Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
208 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
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However, not all cases will be this clear. What if state law differed
substantially from federal law in some other way? What would happen in a
state where recreational, personal use of marijuana is quasi-legal in that it is
subject to minor civil penalties only? Should courts excise a subclass of
"noncriminal, recreational, personal, intrastate users of marijuana" who
cannot be prosecuted by the federal government under the CSA? Once again,
it would be state law that determined whether federal prosecutions could
proceed. In states without any such statutes, such subclasses would not exist
and the prosecutions could proceed. As the hypothetical suggests,
fundamental precepts of uniformity and supremacy argue against any such
result. Federal law should be more than the default position. "
The fact that the Raich Court did not go down this road is strong
evidence that a substantial, perhaps radical, extension of the New Federalism
did not occur. There are other aspects of Raich that lead to the same
conclusion. One of the most important aspects of the New Federalism,
potentially present in Raich, is the concept of states serving as
laboratories. 209 Advocates of state power often cite as an advantage of
federalism the ability of states to experiment with differing solutions to social
problems. 210 These solutions might then be adopted by other states or by the
federal government. Justice O'Connor criticized the majority sharply for
"extinguish[ing]" any such laboratory role in Raich.211 However, the
laboratory analogy seems best applied to situations in which no government
has formulated a solution, or, at least, in which the legal landscape leaves
wide room to maneuver. This is hardly the case with drugs. The national
government has established a policy that stands until the national government
is convinced to change it. In a variant on the "political safeguards of
209 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2229 (2005) (O'Connor, J. dissenting)
("[T]he federalism principles that have driven our Commerce Clause cases require that
room for experiment be protected in this case."); see also id. at 2239 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("Our federalist system, properly understood, allows California and a growing
number of other States to decide for themselves how to safeguard the health and welfare
of their citizens.").
2 10 Id. at 2220 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("One of federalism's chief virtues, of
course, is that it promotes innovation by allowing for the possibility that 'a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."') (quoting New State
Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); see Calabresi,
supra note 144, at 777 (describing Brandeis' view as creating "an incentive for state
governments to experiment and improve"). But cf Gey, supra note 2, at 1671 (expressing
doubt about the factual premise of the laboratory theory).
211 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2221; see id. at 2229 (Raich "stifles an express choice by
some States, concerned for the lives and liberties of their people, to regulate medical
marijuana differently.").
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federalism"'212 argument, Justice Stevens argued that California and like-
minded states could use the political process to achieve acceptance for their
results. 213 Given the size of California's congressional delegation, this is
hardly a fanciful contention. However, striking down federal statutes so that
the "laboratories" are free to experiment would be a substantial expansion of
the judicial role in federalism disputes. It would go well beyond Justice
Kennedy's Lopez concurrence and its invocation of the laboratory role.
Beyond the laboratory argument of providing useful examples for other
jurisdictions lies a more fundamental justification for federalism: the
possibility, and desirability, that states will be different. As Professor
Calabresi puts it,
The opening argument for state power is that social tastes and
preferences differ, that those differences correlate significantly with
geography, and that social utility can be maximized if governmental units
are small enough and powerful enough so that local laws can be adapted to
local conditions, something the national government, with its uniform
lawmaking power, is. largely unable to.do.214
In a relevant example, Professors Nelson and Pushaw contend that "if
51% of Americans believe that drug use should be dealt with through harsh
criminal sanctions, and 49% think it should be addressed through education
and rehabilitation, it is better that state laws reflect that diversity (however
unevenly) than to impose one view (e.g., strict criminalization)
nationwide." 215 The criminal law in general is a prime example of the
"cultural federalism" that the New Federalism seeks to enhance. 216 However,
as long as a majority favors criminal sanctions in the drug context, it seems
essential to achieve them through federal law. The problem has substantial
212 Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv.
543 (1954). The core of Professor Wechsler's thesis is that the states are adequately
represented in Congress and can rely on it to protect federalism interests. Judicial
intervention for this purpose is not necessary. Id. at 558-59.
213 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2213-14.
214 Calabresi, supra note 144, at 775.
215 Grant S. Nelson & Robert J: Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause:
Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State
Control over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REv. 1, 116-17 (1999). Professors Nelson and
Pushaw accept the federal drug laws in general, but would exempt donative transfers and
mere possession without intent to sell. Id. at 137-38; see infra note 300 (discussing their
test for "commerce" and its implications for the aggregation principle).
216 Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 215, at 113.
2005]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
interstate and international dimensions. Moreover, federal criminal
legislation is closely tied to national regulation of drugs.
Not only did the Court refuse to extend the New Federalism; it also
ignored its rhetoric. In this respect, it is helpful to consider the role that key
phrases of the New Federalism vocabulary played in Raich. The majority and
concurring opinions in Lopez, the majority opinion in Morrison, and the
dissents in Raich are replete with phrases that have come, in many ways, to
symbolize the New Federalism. These include: the notion of spheres of state
autonomy,217 state sovereignty, 218 the lack of a national police power, 219 the
special state role in criminal law,220 the role of enumerated federal powers as
a guarantee of state power,221 and dual federalism. 222 These are not only
phrases with important symbolic content. They point toward a methodology
for evaluating federal statutes. This methodology would treat any "incursion"
on federalism values as playing a role in assessing the validity of the federal
law. In his concurring opinion in Lopez, Justice Kennedy stated that "the
statute before us upsets the federal balance to a degree that renders it an
unconstitutional assertion of the commerce power, and our intervention is
required. '223 For Justice Kennedy, if Congress attempts to extend the
commerce power too far, "then at the least we must inquire whether the
exercise of national power seeks to intrude upon an area of traditional state
concern." 224 In Morrison, the majority took a step further towards such a
mode of analysis. After stating that "[t]he Constitution requires a distinction
between what is truly national and what is truly local," 225 Chief Justice
Renquist cited the criminal law as a prime example. 226 It is possible that his
language, which came in the Commerce Clause context, is only directed at
217 See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2220 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 577 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
218 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2226 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
2 19 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2222 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618-
19; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 (majority opinion).
22 0 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2224 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613;
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 (majority opinion).
221 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2226 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619;
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (majority opinion).
222 See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2234 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Morrison, 529
U.S. at 608; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557.
223 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
224 Id.
225 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618-19 (2000).
226 Id. at 619.
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determining whether a particular activity is "commerce" or "interstate
commerce." However, the language is perhaps more a step toward attempting
to identify spheres of state authority that the national government cannot
reach regardless of whether it has prima facie power.227
In Raich, however, it is only in the dissents that this analysis plays a
substantial role. Justice O'Connor stated that "because fundamental structural
concerns about dual sovereignty animate our Commerce Clause cases, it is
relevant that this case involves the interplay of federal and state regulation in
areas of criminal law and social policy in which 'States lay claim by right of
history and expertise.' "228 She also declared that "a concern for dual
sovereignty requires that Congress' [s] excursion into the traditional domain
of States be justified. ' 229 Justice Thomas, in his analysis of whether the CSA,
in its application to the Raich facts, was "proper," used similar language. 230
One of the surprising aspects of Raich is that neither the majority
opinion, joined by Justice Kennedy, nor the concurrence authored by Justice
Scalia, made serious reference to these concepts and their implications for
national power. Justice Stevens, who had dissented in Lopez and described
the decision as "radical," 231 portrayed the Commerce Clause as the central
component of American federalism, while ignoring the New Federalism
rhetoric completely. 232 Justice Scalia did quote from Lopez about the danger
of letting the Clause obliterate the line between "what is truly national and
what is truly local," 233 but found no such danger in Raich. Justice Stevens'
other reference to federalism problems is his invocation of the Supremacy
Clause in rejecting the notion that state law could affect the validity of
federal law. 234 Obviously, both the majority and Justice Scalia realized that
the case was about federalism. These justices simply did not think that
227 See Peter J. Henning, Misguided Federalism, 68 Mo. L. REv. 389, 394 n.32
(2003) (criticizing the notion of criminal law as a separate sphere and citing numerous
critiques of the sphere approach).
228 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2224 (2005) (O'Connor, J. dissenting)
(quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Justice O'Connor also cited
to Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Lopez and her earlier dissenting opinion in Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 586 (1985) ("'[s]tate
autonomy is a relevant factor in assessing the means by which Congress exercises its
powers' under the Commerce Clause") (alteration in original).
229 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2226 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
230 Id. at 2234 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
231 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 602 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
232 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2205.
233 Id. at 2218 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also id. at 2216 ("what is [truly] national
and what is [truly] local").
234 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2212-13 n.38 (2005) (majority opinion).
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anything the Court has said recently on the subject required considering a
departure from the Wickard-based analysis that plays such a key role in their
opinions. The standard phrases that accompany New Federalism analysis are
conspicuous in their absence, in particular, the notion that federal criminal
statutes present special problems because they touch on an area of traditional
state concern.
The prominent role of Wickard will be particularly galling to advocates
of the New Federalism. Lopez had described that case as representing the
outer limits of the Court's tolerant view of the Commerce Clause and the
reach of legislation based on it.235 Conservatives have long viewed Wickard
with suspicion,236 particularly because of the possibilities it opens of broad
federal regulation of intrastate activity, even when that activity seems totally
removed and separate from any interstate market. A logi"cal next step for
New Federalists would be to call for the Court to overrule or substantially
limit Wickard. In their landmark analysis of Commerce Clause doctrine,
Professors Nelson and Pushaw express sympathy for conservative arguments
that would limit the role-of aggregation. 237 However, they appear to accept
Wickard "because in our integrated national economy, almost any
commercial activity might reasonably be viewed as affecting interstate
commerce." 238 Their overall solution is for the Court to adopt a more limited
view of the Commerce Clause in general. 239 Raich does not seem a step in
that direction, despite its emphasis on the economic/commercial line.
235 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
236 E.g., United States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225, 232 (5th Cir. 2000) (Jolly, J.,
dissenting); cf. Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 12-13, Raich v. Ashcroft 352 F.3d 1222 (2003) (No. 03-1454)
(explaining that because virtually any conceivable activity in the aggregate affects
interstate commerce, Wickard's aggregation analysis has the potential to remove all limits
on Congress's authority). Professor McGinnis has stated that "[p]erhaps the ultimate
indignity that federalism suffered in [the New Deal] period was Wickard v. Filburn."
McGinnis, supra note 144, at 511. See Calabresi, supra note 144, at 804 (stating that
there was "no reason [in Lopez] for the Court's extreme show of respect for atrocities
such as Wickard"); see also Massey, supra note 2, at 476-79 (discussing and criticizing
Wickard's aggregation principle).
237 Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 215, at 111 n.518.
238 Id.
239 Their test is as follows: "Congress must (1) regulate 'commerce,' (2) that
implicates commerce in more than one state." Id. at 107 (footnote omitted). Recall that
even Justice Thomas, dissenting in Raich, accepted the Wickard rationale:
On its face, a ban on intrastate cultivation, possession and distribution of
marijuana may be plainly adapted to stopping.the interstate flow of marijuana.
Unregulated local growers and users could swell both the supply and the demand
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The question naturally arises whether Raich will have generative force.
A recent pornography case suggests an affirmative answer. 240 As discussed
below,241 there has been ongoing disagreement among the courts of appeals
about the federal government's use of anti-pornography statutes to reach
"personal" pornography, that is, items- generated by individuals with no
apparent connection to any market. In United States v. Smith,242 the lower
court had found such pornography beyond the reach of federal regulatory
power. Three weeks after Raich, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and
vacated the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit, directing the Court of Appeals
to reconsider its decision in light of Raich.243 This remand for
reconsideration in light of Raich does not stand alone.244 Thus, the case
seems to have generative force, a result that will give advocates of the New
Federalism considerable cause for concern.
In sum, Raich refused to build upon Lopez and extend it to intrastate
problems, relied on Wickard, .denied state law any role in challenges to
federal law of the sort presented, and virtually ignored the rhetoric of the
New Federalism, let alone the possibility that this rhetoric signaled a new
methodology for evaluating federal laws. In particular, the Court did not treat
federal criminal statutes as presenting special problems. In addition, as the
various remands of lower courts of appeals decisions for reconsideration in
light of Raich show, it is a precedent to be reckoned with. Taken together, all
of this sounds like a serious setback for the New Federalism..
B. The New Federalism Lives
Nonetheless, there are reasons to believe that the New Federalism
concept, as embodied in Lopez and Morrison, retains its validity. Raich can
be seen more as a refusal to extend it than an abandonment. Let us first
consider the role of Lopez and Morrison in Raich itself. After all, if Lopez
and Morrison are alive and well, then the New Federalism retains
sides of the interstate marijuana market, making the market more difficult to
regulate.
Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2231 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
240 United States v. Smith, 402 F.3d 1303 (1 lth Cir. 2005), vacated 125 S. Ct. 2938
(2005).
241 See infra notes 398-455.
242 Smith, 402 F.3d at 1328.
243 United States v. Smith, 125 S. Ct. 2938 (2005).
244 Id.; United States v. Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042 (11th Cir. 2004), vacated, 126
S. Ct. 321 (2005); Klingler v. Director Dept. Rev., 366 F.3d 614 (8th Cir. 2004), vacated,
125 S. Ct. 2899 (2005); United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated,
125 S. Ct. 2899 (2005).
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considerable force in constitutional analysis. All four opinions in Raich
treated Lopez and Morrison as the major recent cases to guide analysis in
Commerce Clause challenges. I will focus here on the opinions of Justices
Stevens and Scalia. Justice Stevens began his analysis with a citation to
Lopez in a manner that puts that case forward as the definitive recent
guide. 245 It is true that he turned to Wickard as the Commerce Clause
precedent most directly on point.246 However, he later devoted a key part of
the majority opinion to rebutting plaintiffs' attempts to extend Lopez and
Morrison to the situation in Raich.247 Justice Stevens first noted the
important difference in the form of the challenge present before the Court in
Raich248 as opposed to that in Lopez and Morrison. In the latter two cases,
the issue was whether Congress had the power to regulate the conduct at
all.249 Raich presented the different question of how far into potential
subclasses of intrastate conduct a valid general regulatory statute reaches. 250
Justice Stevens viewed as important a second difference in the statutory
context. Lopez had involved "a brief, single-subject statute. '251 It was not a
general regulation of economic activity. Therefore, the situation was not
present in which a general statute can be "undercut" by failure to reach
specific intrastate examples of the conduct in question.252 By contrast, the
CSA is a broad-scale statute, covering a wide range of drugs and possible
uses. Thus, the doctrine of intrastate undercutting could come into play. The
most important distinction between the CSA and the statutes at issue in
Lopez and Morrison was, for Justice Stevens, that those two statutes were
unconstitutional because they "did not regulate economic activity. '253 By
contrast, he presented the CSA as regulating "quintessentially economic" 254
activities, and concluded that "[b]ecause the CSA is a statute that directly
regulates economic, commercial activity, our opinion in Morrison casts no
doubt on its constitutionality. 255
245 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2205 (2005); see id. at nn.24, 26, 27 (citing
Lopez).
246 Id. at 2206-08.
247 Id. at 2209-11.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Id. at 2209.
251 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2209 (2005).
252 See, e.g., id. at 2216-17 (Scalia, J., concurring).
253 Id. at 2210.
254 Id. at 2211.
255 Id.
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Lopez and Morrison, especially the former, play a central role in Justice
Scalia's concurring opinion. He noted both that they recognize the
"expansive scope" 256 of congressional authority under the general rubric of
activities with a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and also that they
recognize the notion of limits on congressional power. 257 As noted earlier,
much of his analysis focused on the possibility of what Lopez referred to as
the existence of "an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity,
in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate
activity were regulated. ' 258 Again drawing on Lopez, he made it clear that
such a regulation can extend to noneconomic activity. He agreed with Justice
Stevens on the importance of the difference in statutory context between
Raich, on the one hand, and Lopez and Morrison on the other: "neither case
involved the power of Congress to exert control over intrastate activities in
connection with a more comprehensive scheme of regulation." 259 As did
Justice Stevens, he saw the economic/commercial line as at the heart of the
holding of invalidity of the federal statutes in Lopez and Morrison: "The
pattern is clear. Where economic activity substantially affects interstate
commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.
260
Particularly noteworthy is the emphasis that Justice Stevens placed on
the economic/commercial line for evaluating the validity of federal
legislation under the third prong of standard Commerce Clause analysis: "the
power to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce."
261
He emphasized the noneconomic nature of the statutes at issue in Lopez and
Morrison as both the reason for their invalidity and the central distinction
from the statute in Raich.262 It is true that his analysis sometimes blurs the
line between regulating commerce and preventing the undercutting of
regulation, 263 but the central point holds: federal statutes that did not directly
regulate economic/commercial activity were struck down. The very reason
for proceeding with the further analysis in Raich was that the CSA did
regulate such activity. Yet the economic/commercial line necessarily
involves the Court in the categorical, formalistic inquiries for which Lopez
256 Id. at 2216 (Scalia, J., concurring).
257 See generally Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2215 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
2 58 Id. at 2217 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).
2 5 9 Id. at 2218.
260 Id. at 2216 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (alteration in original)).
261 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2205.
262 See generally Id. at 2195 (majority opinion).
263 The same criticism can be made of Justice Scalia's analysis.
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and Morrison had been so sharply criticized. 264 Dissenting in the latter case,
Justice Souter decried "formalistically contrived confines of commerce
power."265 With respect to Morrison itself, he castigated the majority in the
following terms:
[T]oday's decision can only be seen as a step toward recapturing the prior
mistakes. Its revival of a distinction between commercial and
noncommercial conduct is at odds with Wickard, which repudiated that
analysis, and the enquiry into commercial purpose, first intimated by the
Lopez concurrence, is cousin to the intent-based analysis employed in
Hammer but rejected for Commerce Clause purposes in Heart of Atlanta
and Darby.26 6
From a New Federalist perspective, the line presents the possibility of
striking down legislation that exceeds an important enumerated power, thus
protecting state authority. The economic/commercial line can also come into
play in statutory interpretation, as established by Jones v. United States267 in
which the Court utilized Lopez and Morrison to construe a federal arson
statute narrowly. 268 The analysis could also lead to a finding of no federal
power in cases which involve a statute that contains a jurisdictional element
requiring an effect on commerce. 269 Thus, the preservation and central role in
Raich of this key analytical element of Lopez and Morrison should be seen as
a significant victory by advocates of the New Federalism.
Before they declare victory, however, there is another aspect of the
majority opinion that should give them considerable pause: the absence of
any reference to the nonattenuation principle that played such a fundamental
role in Lopez and Morrison.270 In Lopez, Justice Rehnquist spent some time
in addressing the government's overall argument that "possession of a
firearm in a local school zone does indeed substantially affect interstate
264 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 638-39 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
265 Id. at 642. This was a principal cause of the judicial crisis of the New Deal
period.
266 Id. at 643 (citations omitted).
267 Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 854 (2000); see George D. Brown,
Constitutionalizing the Federal Criminal Law Debate: Morrison, Jones, and the ABA,
2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 983, 1009-13 (2001).
268 For discussion of Jones, see Bradley, supra note 17, at 583-86; Brown, supra
note 267 at 1009-13.
269 See United States v. Hickman, 179 F.3d 230, 231 (5th Cir. 1999) (dissenting
opinion).
270 1 have already referred to the absence of much of the basic New Federalism
vocabulary in the opinion.
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commerce." 271 Among other contentions, the government argued that there
was a potential effect on travel to areas considered unsafe, but Justice
Rehnquist's main concern seemed to be with the following reasoning:
[T]he presence of guns in schools poses a substantial threat to the
educational process by threatening the learning environment. A
handicapped educational process, in turn, will result in a less productive
citizenry. That, in turn, would have an adverse effect on the Nation's
economic well-being. As a result, the Government argues that Congress
could rationally have concluded that § 922(q) substantially affects interstate
commerce.272
For Justice Rehnquist, such reasoning could lead to congressional power
to regulate everything. For example, the "national productivity" argument
could lead to congressional regulation of "any activity that it found was
related to the economic productivity of individual citizens: family law
(including marriage, divorce, and child custody), for example." 273 Thus, if
the attenuated causal chain was accepted, no areas would be off limits, and
any activity by any individual would be subject to federal regulation. The
result would be a national police power.274
In Morrison, Justice Rehnquist dealt with similar reasoning underlying
the civil remedy of the Violence Against Women Act:275 the notion that
gender-motivated violence affects interstate commerce by deterring travel,
engaging in employment or transacting business, and by increasing medical
and related costs, as well as decreasing the demand for interstate products.
276
He expressed concern over what he referred to as a "but-for causal chain"
from the initial occurrence of violent crime (the suppression of which has
always been the prime object of the States' police power) to every attenuated
effect upon interstate commerce. 277 Indeed, he expressed the concern that
this reasoning would allow Congress to regulate any crime, since the
aggregate effects of that crime could be seen as having a substantial impact
on such economic factors as employment, production, or transit. 278 The
nonattenuation principle seemed in Lopez essentially to play the role of a
271 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563 (1995).
272 Id. at 564.
273 Id.
274 Id. at 567.
275 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613-14 (2000).
276 Id. at 615.
277 Id.
278 Id.
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supporting counter-argument to the government's position. In Morrison,
Chief Justice Rehnquist moved the principle a substantial step toward part of
the core reasoning underlying the holding.2 79 Such a perception of Morrison
would explain the nonattentuation principle's incorporation into the four-part
test that the courts of appeals had derived from Morrison.280 Apart from the
degree to which the principle was central to the holding in either case, it is,
from the New Federalism perspective, perhaps the most important
contribution of Lopez and Morrison to the debate over the nature of our
federal system.
Justices Breyer and Souter really did seem to want to get rid of the
federal system in its present form and let the national government regulate
everything. Dissenting in Lopez, Justice Breyer cited globalization and other
changes in the American economy as justification for a changing approach to
Commerce Clause interpretation. 281 He argued that Congress must at all
times be able to utilize that power so that the nation is not "powerless to
defend itself against economic forces that Congress decrees inimical or
destructive of the national economy. ' 282 In Morrison, Justice Souter
criticized the majority for attempting to revive "the federalism of some
earlier time," 283 and noted the high degree of integration that characterizes
the national economy.284 Justice Breyer, if anything, went further and
essentially called for the abandonment of any serious boundaries within the
federal system, if not for the abandonment of the system itself: "We live in a
Nation knit together by two centuries of scientific, technological,
commercial, and environmental change. Those changes, taken together, mean
that virtually every kind of activity, no matter how local, genuinely can affect
commerce, or its conditions, outside the State-at least when considered in
the aggregate. '285
As long as this reasoning is out there, the New Federalism, or any
federalism, is in danger. Thus, Justice Stevens's omission of any reference to
the nonattenuation principle seems cause for concern. It should also be noted
that this principle played an important role in the application of the four-part
279 Id. at 612.
280 E.g., Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222,1229-34 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom.
Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (discussing the four-part test).
281 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 621 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
282 Id. at 625 (quoting North American Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 705 (1946)).
283 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 655 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
284 Id.
285 Id. at 660 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see Gey, supra note 2, at 1665-68 (questioning
the nonattenuation argument and stating that "in the modem world neither crime nor, for
that matter, marriage, divorce, and childbearing are local affairs").
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test by the Ninth Circuit, and in that court's invalidation of the CSA as
applied. 286 In particular, the appeals court found the same danger of
attenuation 287 that Chief Justice Rehnquist cited in his Lopez and Morrison
opinions.288 The court was concerned that the marijuana in question could
only be regulated at the federal level through a highly attenuated analytical
process which placed it within the realm of the national problem of
marijuana by grouping together acts of possession that bore virtually no
resemblance to each other.289 The notion that the plaintiff's personal drugs
might somehow affect the interstate market seemed an example of the
discredited use of the house-that-Jack-built reasoning.
However, the question in the two contexts is significantly different.
Raich does not present the issue of what Congress can regulate, but how far
into local, intrastate, activity federal regulation can penetrate. This, too, can
be seen as a step toward regulating everything, but it requires the essential
predicate of congressional authority to reach the subject in the first place.
Thus, in considering the status of the nonattenuation principle, it is important
to emphasize that Justice Stevens did draw a line that restricts congressional
authority: the economic/commercial line.290 That line serves the same
purposes as the nonattenuation principle, namely, confining national
authority in order to preserve and advance federalism values. In this respect,
it is instructive to read lower court applications of the four-part test, in which
the economic/commercial nature of regulated activity is one factor, and the
nonattenuation principle is another. Analyses of the two factors often overlap
to the point of coalescing. 291
It is true that one might view Raich as presenting the following
attenuation issue: was the government positing an interconnectedness of
marijuana so that small users could be grouped with interstate traffickers?292
286 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1233 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Gonzales
v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
287 Raich, 352 F.3d at 1233.
288 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612-15; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-67.
289 Raich, 352 F.3d at 1233.
290 See generally Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
291 See, e.g., United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 869 (10th Cir. 2005) (facts of
payment and transportation satisfy both the economic and the nonattenuation
considerations); United States v. Smith, 402 F.3d 1303, 1317, 1322 (11th Cir. 2005),
vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2938 (2005) (conduct not commercial; link too attenuated); United
States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003) ("inference upon inference"
objection to viewing defendant's conduct as economic) (quoting United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995)).
292 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1233 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Gonzales
v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) ("The connections in this case are, indeed, attenuated.");
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However, answering this question in the affirmative does not require
recourse to amorphous concepts like the economic well-being of the nation to
justify the similar treatment. It is the use of such hopelessly general concepts,
and their ability to justify national regulation of e verything, that the
nonattenuation principle rejects. Thus, it seems possible to conclude that the
nonattenuation principle-perhaps the heart of Lopez and Morrison-
survives Justice Stevens' failure to mention it. The majority opinion in Raich,
with its emphasis on the economic/commercial line, was, after all, joined by
one member of the Lopez-Morrison majority, 293 and the judgment was
concurred in by another.294 Raich seems closer to the New, Federalism of
those cases than to the nonfederalism of Justices Breyer and Souter.
In saying this, I do not overlook the possibility that Justice Stevens was
able to slip by, so to speak, a modification of Lopez and Morrison, reducing
those cases to Lopez-Lite. Most important is his deference to Congress and
his use of the rational basis test. Moreover, the result of Raich was to
overturn295 a circuit court opinion striking down federal regulation based
largely on the application of Lopez and Morrison.296 Nonetheless, I view the
opinion and result in the case as more of a stopping point, a refusal to extend,
than any form of serious cutting back of the basic thrust of Lopez and
Morrison.
IV. FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AFTER RAICH
A. The "Explosion " in Federal Criminal Law
There has been a veritable explosion in the number of federal criminal
laws over the last half century. 297 Although precise numbers are hard to
come by, it is usually estimated that there are at least 3000 federal crimes,
and perhaps more than 3600.298 These crimes are not limited to narrow cases
see also Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2236 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The
interconnectedness of economic activity is not a modem phenomenon unfamiliar to the
framers.").
293 Justice Kennedy.
294 Justice Scalia.
295 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2201.
296 Id. at 1234.
297 Am. Bar Ass'n, Criminal Justice Section, Task Force on the Federalization of
Criminal Law, The Federalization of Criminal Law 7, 51 (1998) [hereinafter Report];
NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT
65 (3d ed. 2000).
298 Susan A. Ehrlich, The Increasing Federalization of Crime, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 825,
825-26 (2000); Report, supra note 297, at 9-10 n. 11 (noting difficulty of exact count but
stating that the estimate of 3000 is almost certainly too low).
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of federal interest, such as theft or bribery concerning federal funds,299 but
spread across the entire range of the criminal law. According to Professors
Abrams and Beale, "it is hard to think of a crime under state law that cannot
be prosecuted federally." 300 This extraordinary increase can be attributed in
part to the growth of new threats to national interests, such as terrorism and
the international drug traffic, as well as to perceived state inability to deal
with such threats. However, a Task Force of the American Bar Association
recently offered a more cynical explanation for much of the trend:
New crimes are often enacted in patchwork response to newsworthy
events, rather than as part of a cohesive code developed in response to an
identifiable federal need.... There is widespread recognition that a major
reason for the federalization trend-even when federal prosecution of these
crimes may not be necessary or effective-is that federal crime legislation
is politically popular.301
Not surprisingly, the trend toward a rapid increase in the number of
federal crimes has been seen by many as presenting a serious challenge to the
values of American federalism. After all, the investigation and prosecution of
criminal activity is a principal responsibility of the states. 30 2 Judge Susan
Ehrlich has stated that "federalization obscures the boundaries of political
responsibility and accountability, undermines the confidence constituents
have in their officials, and erodes the authority of state and local
institutions." 30 3 The ABA Task Force weighed in against the trend, going so
far as to state that "it is vital to remember that the American criminal justice
system was set up to operate within distinct spheres of government. ' 3°4
Collateral consequences have been criticized as well, for example, the risk of
whipsawing defendants between the two systems and the general perception
of unfairness generated by widely differing results.30 5
299 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2000).
300 ABRAMs & BEALE, supra note 297, at 64.
301 Report, supra note 297, at 14-15.
302 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610-12 (2000).
303 Ehrlich, supra note 298, at 838.
304 Report, supra note 297, at 24.
305 Id. at34-35.
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B. Federal Criminal Law after Lopez and Morrison
It was widely thought that the decision in Lopez, supplemented by
Morrison, would have an impact on this development. 30 6 Lopez was a
federalism-based decision striking down a federal criminal law. The majority
noted, albeit in a footnote, the role of the states in criminal law enforcement.
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, while focusing on education,
suggested the possibility of spheres of state responsibility. 30 7 Lopez
potentially reined in the Commerce Clause basis for congressional power by
relying on the economic/commercial line as necessary for the validity of
federal legislation, and articulating the nonattenuation principle. Morrison
went further, particularly in its focus on crime. The majority referred to the
suppression of violent crime as a matter "which has always been the prime
object of the States' police power,"30 8 and made clear that a wide-ranging
federal criminal law ran counter to its vision of the federal system. However,
it should be noted that not even Morrison rested on any notion of a "sphere";
rather it applied the Lopez analysis, relying heavily on the noneconomic
nature of violence against women, and also invoking the nonattenuation
principle.309
Even before Morrison, federal defendants rushed to attack federal
criminal statutes. However, their efforts were virtually always
unsuccessful. 310 There are several reasons for this sharp divergence. In part,
it may simply be that the lower courts regarded Lopez as something of a
"sport," that is, a case that presented such an unusual fact pattern that it led to
a one-of-a-kind result. The principal reason appears to have been the
presence in the relevant statutes of a jurisdictional element, that is, a
requirement that the defendant's conduct either have an effect on commerce,
or more frequently, that the defendant or some object connected with the
306 E.g., Brown, supra note 267, at 985.
307 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995).
308 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000).
309 Id. at 613, 615.
310 Bradley, supra note 17, at 575 (referring to the "nearly unanimous views of the
courts of appeals"); Brown, supra note 267, at 985 n. 19 (citing United States v. Trupin,
117 F.3d 678, 685 n.3 (2d Cir. 1997)) ("Numerous statutes have been upheld against
post-Lopez Commerce Clause challenges in this and other courts."); United States v.
Sirois, 87 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a)); United States v.
Serrentino, 72 F.3d 294, 296 (2d Cir. 1995) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)); United
States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 585-88 (3d Cir. 1995) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 2119)); see
generally ABRAMs & BEALE, supra note 297, at 32, 54 (discussing trend in courts of
appeal).
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crime have traveled in interstate commerce. 311 It should be noted that the
Lopez Court (as was later the case in Morrison) distinguished the statute
before it on the grounds that it contained no such jurisdictional element.312
Thus, it was easy for the lower courts to conclude either that the mere
presence of a jurisdictional element saved a statute from possible invalidity,
or to construe statutes using this technique in a way that made satisfying the
requirements of the elements a simple task for prosecutors. Raich is an
example of a small group of cases in which lower courts did use Lopez and
Morrison to strike down criminal statutes.313 Federal prosecutions of highly
personal, intrastate activity such as home-grown marijuana and family
pornography appeared to these courts to go beyond the outer edge of any
class of activities that Congress could regulate. 314 Not even the presence of a
jurisdictional element was sufficient in the pornography cases. 315 These
courts utilized the four-part test drawn from Morrison's elaboration on
Lopez, and emphasized the economic/commercial line and the nonattenuation
principle in striking down statutes.316 Furthermore, the Supreme Court
strengthened the possibility of constitutional analysis in its decision in Jones
v. United States,317 which utilized the constitutional precepts of Lopez and
Morrison to guide statutory construction in a manner that led to finding the
federal arson statute's requirements unmet.318
Thus, as of the early 2000s, there existed a curious dichotomy between
the Supreme Court and the lower courts. The former had three times sent
strong signals that there are constitutional limits to the development of
federal criminal law. 319 Yet the latter seemed virtually to ignore these
signals.320 The momentum behind the growing body of federal criminal law
had certainly not stopped. Congress continued to consider a wide range of
possible new criminal statutes. According to Judge Ehrlich, in the 105th
Congress,
311 E.g., United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 585-88 (3d Cir. 1995).
3 12 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
313 See generally Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom.
Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
314 E.g., id. at 1234.
315 E.g., United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1115 (9th Cir. 2003).
316 E.g., Raich, 352 F.3d at 1229-34.
317 Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 851 (2000).
3 18 Id. at 858-59.
319 See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Jones v. United
States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
320 Bradley, supra note 17, at 575.
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hundreds of bills were introduced having to do with federal criminal
statutes, many of which pertained to juvenile justice, including one
unsuccessful measure that would require that 14- and 15-year-olds be tried
as adults if accused of offenses constituting what Congress defines as
serious violent crimes or drug offenses.32 1
Despite the Supreme Court cases, the authors of such bills could point to
widely differing results in the lower courts, should constitutional objections
be raised. Indeed, the ABA Task Force report, published three years after
Lopez, reached the surprising conclusion that the political process is the only
check on the growth of federal criminal statutes: "[t]he opportunity to limit
the excessive federalization of local crimes rests entirely with Congress."
322
C. Federal Criminal Law After Raich
Whatever momentum existed before 2005, Raich can only sustain and
probably increase it. Once the Court has concluded that a statute passes the
initial hurdle for substantial effects analysis, as was the case in Raich,
Congress's power to legislate broadly under that category is striking. As
Professor Bradley remarked, prior to Raich, "[a]s long as the 'substantial
effects' test remains on the books, federal criminal jurisdiction, even if
somewhat constrained, will continue to be broad. ' 323 The six to three
decision upheld a federal criminal statute, using Wickard-based analysis, at
the outer limits of its intrastate application. As noted, Raich seemed to reject
any "sphere" or other state sovereignty notion of limiting federal law, and did
not give support to the approach of subjecting federal statutes to a four-part
test based on Lopez and Morrison.324
Raich, however, does not mean carte blanche, as long as Lopez and
Morrison are on the books.325 After all, the economic/commercial line does
have to be satisfied, and Lopez and Morrison demonstrate that there are
class-of-activity statutes that do not satisfy it. I have argued above that a high
degree of acceptance of the nonattenuation principle is implicit in Raich,
326
but admit that the matter is somewhat left up in the air. Battles remain to be
fought. It is likely that the wide use of jurisdictional elements will come
321 Ehrlich, supra note 298, at 825.
322 Report, supra note 297, at 51.
323 Bradley, supra note 17, at 579.
324 See supra Part II.B.
325 Like Professor Bradley, I have argued that the constitutional overtones of Jones
are also significant. Bradley, supra note 17, at 573; Brown, supra note 267, at 1009.
326 See supra notes 290-91.
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under increasing scrutiny. 327 Some courts have already indicated a
willingness to hold jurisdictional elements ineffective to sustain federal
legislative power. Questions of limits will remain, although the remands of
several decisions favorable to defendants for consideration in light of
Raich328 suggest that the hospitable attitude demonstrated in Raich will
continue to have an effect. Overall, the notion of an expansive federal
criminal law is strengthened by the decision. The main question now may
shift to consideration of what it should look like. In this respect, the ABA
Task Force's emphasis on the legislative process seems vindicated. Indeed, it
would be an anomaly of the New Federalism if the area in which it appeared
to have made some of its greatest gains-the criminal law-was now
remitted to the congressional process and the "political safeguards of
federalism" that often are the antithesis of the federalism found in Lopez.
It seems clear that we will have a wide-ranging federal criminal law
rather than one based on notions of spheres or of a sharp demarcation
between the two levels of government. It is true that the debate will continue,
a debate that Professors Abrams and Beale have characterized "as a
disagreement between the federalizers and the anti-federalizers," 329 but the
former are clearly in the ascendancy. Furthermore, it is doubtful that any
significant limit can be imposed by a search for "principles" that perform a
sub-constitutional function of demarcation. 330 Thus, what ,we are likely to
see, as is already the case to a considerable degree, is an increasing overlap
between criminal statutes at both the state and federal levels. In an important
article, Harry Litman and Mark Greenberg defend this model. vigorously:
It is often impossible to draft a statute in a way that includes only those
crimes that are sophisticated, interjurisdictional, or sensitive enough to
require a federal solution. In order to allow sufficient flexibility to bring a
federal prosecution when an aspect of a law enforcement problem requires
it, federal criminal legislation inevitably will have to be overinclusive.3 31
327 Brown, supra note 267, at 10 13-23.
328 United States v. Smith, 402 F.3d 1303 (1 1th Cir.2005), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2938
(2005); United States v. Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042 (1 1th Cir. 2004), vacated, 126 S. Ct.
321 (2005); Klingler v. Director Dept. Rev., 366 F.3d 614.(8th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125
S. Ct. 2899 (2005); United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, 125
S. Ct. 2899 (2005).
329 ABRAMs & BEALE, supra note 297, at 65.
330 See id. at 68.
331 Litman & Greenberg, supra note 20, at 964-65. Professor Kurland has
demonstrated that historically the states and federal government have had concurrent
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Advocates of a broad federal criminal law point out that this model has
been continuously present since the early days of the Republic. 332 The Court
has not been hospitable to efforts to curtail it. A unanimous decision
concerning the scope of the Hobbs Act stated that "[w]ith regard to the
concern about disturbing the federal state balance ... there is no question
that Congress intended to define as a federal crime conduct that it knew was
punishable under state law." 333 The New Federalists were swimming
upstream when they attempted to establish spheres of state authority,
particularly the criminal law.334 Raich makes the task even harder.
D. As-Applied Challenges in the Commerce Clause Context
Raich appears to have put to rest the controverted question of whether as-
applied challenges can be brought to the intrastate manifestations of federal
statutes regulating interstate commerce. That there is an issue at all is
surprising given what Professor Fallon calls the "familiar understanding that
as-applied challenges are the normal mode of constitutional adjudication." 335
The Supreme Court has often expressed strong reservations about facial
challenges-the analytical technique at the other end of the constitutional
spectrum from as-applied challenges. 336 In the 2004 decision of Sabri v.
United States, the Court stated:
Although passing on the validity of a law wholesale may be efficient in the
abstract, any gain is often offset by losing the lessons taught by the
particular, to which common law method normally looks. Facial
adjudication carries too much promise of 'premature interpretatio[n] of
statutes' on the basis of factually bare-bones records.337
jurisdiction in the area of criminal law. Adam H. Kurland, First Principles of American
Federalism and the Nature of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 45 EMORY L.J. 1 (1996).
332 See Henning, supra note 227, at 413 (The Court "has historically accepted that
federal provisions operate in many areas already subject to state regulation. The fact that
both the federal and state governments can enforce criminal laws covering similar
conduct has not been troubling in a constitutional sense."); Kurland, supra note 331, at 58
(discussing overlapping criminal jurisdiction in the context of the postal power).
333 United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 379 (1978).
334 See Henning, supra note 227, at 394 n.32.
335 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party
Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1329 (2000).
336 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987); Fallon, supra note 335, at
1342-59.
337 Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609 (2004) (alteration in original) (citing
United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960)).
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On the other hand, as-applied challenges have the advantage of
considering statutes in the context of particular applications. As Professor
Fallon puts it, "statutes often are best understood as encompassing a number
of subrules, which frequently are specified only in the process of statutory
application, and.., some subrules may validly be applied even if others may
not."33
8
In the Commerce Clause context, however, doubt has existed about
whether litigants could challenge a generally valid statute when the challenge
was to the law's application to their intrastate, small-scale activities. The
main source of these doubts was the famous quote from Maryland v.
Wirtz,339 repeated frequently by the Court, including in the majority opinion
in Lopez, that "where a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation
to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under
that statute is of no consequence." 340 The decision in Perez v. United
States341 is illustrative of the approach embodied in the quote. Perez involved
the application of a general law on "extortionate credit transactions" to a
local loan shark. The Supreme Court reviewed and accepted Congress's
conclusion that loan-sharking was a national problem, frequently tied to
organized crime. 342 The Court concluded that Congress could properly deal
with loan-sharking as a class of activities. 343 Since the defendant was a
member of the class, the principle articulated in Wirtz controlled.344
It can thus be argued that substantive Commerce Clause doctrine bars as-
applied challenges of the sort presented in Raich. This was the position taken
338 Fallon, supra note 335, at 1334. It should be noted that Fallon does not regard
the distinction between the two types of challenges as clear cut.
339 Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 n.27 (1968).
340 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). As the Ninth Circuit has pointed
out, that sentence originated in a discussion of congressional power to regulate all aspects
of a single enterprise. United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 2003),
vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2899 (2005) ("Read in context, the sentence ... can only mean that
where a general regulatory statute governs a large enterprise, it does not matter that its
components have a de minimus relation to interstate commerce on their own."). Stewart,
348 F.3d at 1141. However, the sentence has taken on a life of its own and is generally
read broadly as its language invites.
341 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
342 Id. at 157.
343 Id. at 153-55.
344 Id. at 154 (citing Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 193). In Perez the Court stated cryptically
that "[i]n the setting of the present case there is a tie-in between local loan sharks and
interstate crime." Id. at 155.
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by Judge Trott in United States v. McCoy,345 a case involving "personal"
intrastate child pornography. He drew on Wirtz and on other Supreme Court
cases to conclude that "if the general regulatory statute at issue does bear a
substantial relation to commerce, an 'as applied' challenge is
inappropriate. ' 346 He then applied Lopez and Morrison, as well as the four-
part test that courts of appeals had distilled from them, to determine whether
the general statute on child pornography was valid.347 The defendant's
conduct was irrelevant to the inquiry. A strong argument can be made that
Judge Trott was correct. An as-applied challenge permits reconsideration of
the validity of regulation of the class after that issue has been decided. It
represents a sort of second constitutional bite at the apple.
However, Judge Trott was dissenting from a decision in which a majority
of the Ninth Circuit did precisely what he viewed as forbidden: entertain an
as-applied challenge to the intrastate conduct at issue.348 The majority
utilized the same four factors to resolve what it specifically described as an
as-applied challenge. 349 It stated the issue as follows:
[W]hether a statute enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause may
constitutionally reach non-commercial, non-economic individual conduct
that is purely intrastate in nature, when there is no reasonable basis for
concluding that the conduct had or was intended to have any significant
interstate connection or any substantive effect on interstate commerce.3 50
In a recent important article, Professor Henning has criticized cases such
as McCoy, and the lower courts' willingness to entertain as-applied
challenges to federal criminal prosecutions. 351 He sees the lower courts as
improperly utilizing federalism principles as an additional check-beyond
any statutory or constitutional inquiry-to block interference by federal
prosecutors with inherently local crimes. He warns that
[t]he application of federalism to prohibit a particular prosecution of an
offense-despite the constitutionality of the statute-because a federal
court deems the conduct to fall within the category of a 'truly local' crime
345 United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003) (Trott, J.,
dissenting).
346Id. at 1135.
347 Id. at 1137-40.
34 8 See id. at 1133.
34 9 Id. at 1119; see also United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132, 1140-43 (9th Cir.
2003), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2899 (2005) (discussing and defending as-applied challenges).
350 Id. at 1117.
351 Henning, supra note 227, at 436-42.
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has the hallmark of a standardless judicial authority to assess the propriety
of the decision to prosecute.
3 52
Professor Henning is certainly correct that the lower courts often express
a preference for state prosecution of local matters353 and refer frequently to
federalism issues in the context of the prosecutions he discusses. 354 However,
it is also possible, in some cases, to view the lower courts as engaging in
Commerce Clause analysis, as the Ninth Circuit maintained in McCoy.
355
Like other commentators, Professor Henning accepts the validity of
Professor Monaghan's concept of the "valid rule of law" requirement: the
right to be governed by laws that are within the power of the legislature to
enact.356 The question then becomes whether Congress's power to reach
intrastate manifestations of an activity it can regulate on the interstate level is
part of the issue of the statute's validity. In theory, the valid interstate
component shields the rule from a facial challenge of the Lopez variety.
Nonetheless, is the challenge to intrastate application a form of challenge to
the rule's validity?
One might contend that once the basic issue of the rule's validity is
settled, any challenges to intrastate applications are of the as-applied variety
and are subject to the limitations on such claims. Professor Henning states
that an as-applied challenge involves the assertion of individual rights such
as free speech or trial by jury.357 The Commerce Clause may not be a source
of such rights. "The Commerce Clause-or the other enumerated powers-
does not provide individuals with any rights beyond the requirement of a
valid rule adopted pursuant to a legitimate exercise of constitutional
352 Id. at 446-47.
353 E.g., United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 2003).
354 Henning, supra note 227, at 395-96. Professor Henning states:
[s]ome lower courts, encouraged by off-handed references in Supreme Court
opinions about the limiting effect of federalism on congressional authority to reach
certain types of crimes, have taken that cue to reject the federal government's power
to pursue a particular case even when the statute itself is a proper exercise of
Congress's power to regulate. This application of federalism creates a new form of
judicial supervisory authority to invoke a vague constitutional limitation-one not
mentioned explicitly in the Constitution--to limit the national government's power
to pursue criminal prosecutions.
Id. (footnote omitted).
355 See McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1117-31.
356 See Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 3-4; Henning,
supra note 227, at 432; Fallon, supra note 335, at 1327.
357 Henning, supra note 227, at 436.
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authority. ' 358 Once the facial validity of a statute is established, there is
nothing left for the individual litigant to assert in the as-applied challenge.
On the other hand, the challenge to intrastate application does seem
similar to a valid rule argument: Congress's power does not reach the
subclass of activities in which the challenger participates; thus it lacks
authority to regulate those activities. The challenger is asserting at the
intrastate level the same valid rule right asserted in Lopez at the interstate
level. 359 There are two bites at the apple because there are two apples
(indeed, there might be multiple bites at the intrastate apple360). Even Perez
may provide support for such an approach. It referred to the general rule
about class-of-activities statutes with the possible qualification that the class
be "within the reach of federal power."361 For the Ninth Circuit in Raich, this
requirement was key to its ability to analyze the constitutionality of the CSA
as applied to the subclass of intrastate, noncommercial cultivation,
possession, and use of marijuana for personal medical purposes on the advice
of a physician and in accordance with state law.362 From the New Federalist
point of view, one might add that the breadth of judicial review of federalism
issues is directly related to the availability of that review in the first place.
Thus, New Federalists would be expected to favor as-applied challenges as a
general matter. Moreover, it is only through such challenges that the courts
can resolve the difficult problems posed by "outer limits" cases such as the
pornography cases discussed below.3 63
358 Id. at 443. But see Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 448 (1991) ("The Court has
often described the Commerce Clause as conferring a 'right' to engage in interstate trade
free from restrictive state regulation."). The Court held that a successful challenge to state
regulation on dormant Commerce Clause grounds entitled the challenger to attorney's
fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 because he had successfully asserted "rights, privileges, or
immunities" under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 446. The result effectively overrules
Consolidated Freightways v. Kassel, 730 F.2d 1139, 1144 (8th Cir. 1984) (The
Commerce Clause is not a source of rights cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.).
359 In Raich, Justice Thomas compared the challenge in that case to Lopez and
Morrison and stated that "[t]here is no reason why, when Congress exceeds the scope of
its commerce power, courts may not invalidate Congress'[s] overreaching on a case-by-
case basis." Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2238 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
360 See United States v. Morales-de Jesus, 372 F.3d 6, 18 (1st Cir. 2004) (discussing
possibility of multiple as-applied challenges to child pornography statutes). At some
point, probably sooner rather than later, substantive Commerce Clause doctrine or
principles of stare decisis would operate to stop a succession of challenges.
361 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971).
362 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1228-29 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom.
Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
363 See infra notes 418-55.
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In any event, the Supreme Court decision in Raich appears to validate
unequivocally as-applied challenges to intrastate permutations of regulations
of interstate commerce such as the CSA. All four opinions in the case discuss
the challengers' circumstances and the bearing of Wickard on them. 364 Thus,
all four opinions can be said to consider the constitutionality of the CSA as
applied to the subclass before the Court. Justice Stevens and Justice
O'Connor specifically described the class involved.365 For Justice Scalia, the
regulation in question was valid "however the class of regulated activities is
subdivided. '366 Justice Thomas agreed with the Ninth Circuit's description of
the class. 367 There remains the troubling question whether one is free to bring
an as-applied challenge in such circumstances, but will always lose. Justice
Stevens invoked the Wirtz quote,368 and stated that the Court's Commerce
Clause cases "foreclose" the challengers' claim.369 On the other hand, he
engaged in an extensive analysis of how that claim fared under Wickard, in
particular.370 In theory, at least, plaintiffs might have won, as they did below.
The Ninth Circuit's error lay not in hearing their claim, but in getting it
wrong.
E. Jurisdictional Elements-The Last Frontier
Raich solidifies the status of class-of-activity statutes. Attention will now
turn to one of the most controversial issues in federal criminal law: the role
of jurisdictional elements in criminal statutes passed under the commerce
power.371 Although New Federalists have seemed to favor these statutes,
they have the potential to totally undermine federalism and to lead to a true
national police power. It may be helpful to review the distinction between the
two types of statutes. A class-of-activity statute singles out a particular form
of criminal activity, for example, loan-sharking; defines it (extortionate credit
transactions in which a threat of violence or other crime underlies the
364 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2206-08 (Stevens, J., writing for the majority); id. at 2217
(Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 2225-27 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 2238 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
365 Id. at 2211-16 (majority opinion) (narrowing class as defined by lower court);
id. at 2226-28 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
366 Id. at 2220 (Scalia, J., concurring).
367 Id. at 2233, 2239 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
368 Id. at 2206 (majority opinion).
3 6 9 Id. at 2215.
370 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2205-09 (2005).
371 See generally Henning, supra note 227, at 429-31 (discussing jurisdictional
elements and their importance after Lopez and Morrison).
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obligation to repay); and provides criminal penalties. A jurisdictional
element statute adds to the criminal activity a specific link to interstate
commerce. This link is an element of the crime, and the prosecution must
prove it as part of its case. For example, the Travel Act punishes any person
who "travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses.., any facility in
interstate or foreign commerce ... with intent to" commit certain crimes.372
The Hobbs Act punishes any person who
in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or
extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical
violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do
anything in violation of this section.373
What accounts for the difference between these two techniques of
statutory drafting under the Commerce Clause? Justice Breyer has suggested
that the difference may reflect a congressional choice to deal with a matter
either "instance by instance" or "problem by problem. '374 Congress may not
be able to define the problem in advance in a manner that is consistent with
its constitutional authority. For example, the Hobbs Act seems to recognize
that not all robberies affect commerce, but that some may. The conservative
members of the Court have taken the matter a step further and expressed an
apparent preference for jurisdictional element statutes. 375 They see the
jurisdictional element as a technique for limiting federal authority. In Lopez,
the majority noted that the statute "contains no jurisdictional element which
would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in
question affects interstate commerce. '376 In Morrison, the same majority
repeated this quote and underscored its importance in the following terms:
"[s]uch a jurisdictional element may establish that the enactment is in
pursuance of Congress' [s] regulation of interstate commerce. 377
However, it is important to distinguish between what can be referred to
as "effects" elements and "nexus" elements. 378 The former tie the criminal
372 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1994).
373 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994).
374 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 630-31 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
375 E.g., id. at 561.
376 Id.
377 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000).
378 Brown, supra note 267, at 1014; see ABRAMs & BEALE, supra note 297, at 31
("Issues that arise in connection with the 'affecting commerce' formula and concems
about this approach are quite different from those that attach to the transportation or
travel across a state line jurisdictional basis.").
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activity in question closely to the third category of Commerce Clause
authority recognized in Lopez: substantial effects on interstate commerce.
Nexus elements, however, derive from categories one and two, as outlined in
that case, particularly the power over the "channels" of interstate
commerce. 379 The potential problem for conservatives is that virtually
everything or every person moves in interstate commerce at some point, and
that nexus elements could lead to open-ended congressional power. A good
example is the federal child pornography statute, utilizing as one
jurisdictional element the fact that the materials used to produce the
pornography had traveled in "interstate commerce." 3
80
Raich itself is directly relevant to statutes with effects elements. Its
emphasis on the economic/commercial line indicates the necessity for such
conduct at some point in the case. Professor Bradley breaks this inquiry
down by arguing for a focus either on the defendant's conduct or on the
victim's status.381 Consider a prosecution under the Hobbs Act for extortion
of a public official. One might argue that extortion is itself a consensual
economic transaction.382 Professor Bradley's analysis would focus on the
importance to the national economy of the political process and its
decisions. 383 Either way, the effects element is satisfied. Robbery cases are
harder to deal with under the Hobbs Act. Robbery is not an
economic/commercial activity. Thus, federal jurisdiction would, initially,
depend on the commercial nature of the person or entity robbed. Robberies of
private individuals would probably not satisfy a rigorous application of the
economic/commercial line, while those of businesses would. As Professor
Bradley puts it, "robbery of a pizza deliveryman while he is on duty violates
the Hobbs Act. Robbery of him off-duty does not."384
379 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
380 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (2000). The alternative jurisdictional element is
satisfied if the visual depiction "has been mailed, or has been shipped or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce .... Id.
381 Bradley, supra note 17, at 604-05.
382 Brown, supra note 267, at 1022; Peter J. Henning, Federalism and the Federal
Prosecution of State and Local Corruption, 92"KY. L.J. 75, 134 (Fall 2003-2004).
383 Bradley, supra note 17, at 587-90; see also Henning, supra note 382, at 123
(contending that because "[c]orruption is largely an economic offense," Congress could
use the Commerce Clause to criminalize state and local bribery). Professor Henning
states his overall view of the matter as follows: "Misuse of governmental authority
enriches both officeholders and those offering bribes because it is likely to result in a
misallocation of governmental resources." Id.
384 Bradley, supra note 17, at 610. Repeated robberies by those "in the business" of
robbery would constitute commerce and represent an example of Professor Bradley's
focus on the defendant.
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It is at this point that jurisdictional element statutes utilizing the effects
approach diverge from their class-of-activities counterparts by apparently
requiring a quantitative analysis of the individual case. Although the Hobbs
Act uses the verb "affect," the lesson of Lopez would appear to be that a
substantial effect is necessary in category three situations. 385 Thus, even
when the prosecution has gotten over the economic/commercial line, it still
faces a quantitative dilemma. As Justice O'Connor has stated: "individual
litigants could always exempt themselves from Commerce Clause regulation
merely by pointing to the obvious-that their personal activities do not have
a substantial effect on interstate commerce. '386 In theory, a jurisprudence
could be developed establishing just how much individual activity is enough.
There is support for a case-by-case inquiry. For example, in the Jones arson
case, the government argued that the substantial threshold was met when an
out-of-state insurer was obliged to pay more than $75,000 for the arson in
question.387 A number of alternative solutions have been suggested,
including a de minimis effect on commerce,388 but the inquiry probably turns
on whether the defendant's conduct can be aggregated with similar instances
to determine whether activity of that nature and volume creates a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. I believe that Professor Bradley is correct in
his view that aggregation is possible. 389 While I have argued elsewhere that
there is a serious question "whether one may legitimately apply class of
activity analysis to an individualized form of draftsmanship such as an effect
element," 390 the endorsement in Raich of as-applied challenges to class-of-
activities statutes suggests that courts will engage in similar inquiries
whether evaluating a subclass under such a statute, or the effects of
individual conduct on interstate commerce in the case of a statute with an
effects jurisdictional element. In each case, the aggregation technique of
Wickard will be utilized.
Defendants in Raich-type challenges ask for a focus on their activities,
but the courts routinely consider the way in which the statute applies to all
385 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).
386 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2223 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
387 Brown, supra note 267, at 1019-20; see United States v. Hickman, 179 F.3d 230,
243-44 (5th Cir. 1999) (DeMoss, J., specially dissenting) ("[T]he truly determinative
question ... is whether the conduct in this case 'substantially affects interstate
commerce.' It is that standard, after all, which is our constitutional touchstone, and which
should ultimately control the outcome of this case.").
388 See generally ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 297, at 216-18 (discussing
alternative solutions).
389 Bradley, supra note 17, at 593; see generally id. at 592-597 (discussing
competing theories).
390 Brown, supra note 267, at 1019.
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those similarly situated.391 The same approach should apply to jurisdictional
element challenges. The situations are analytically alike: an apparent focus
on one person requires consideration of all those similarly situated to
measure effect on commerce. The constitutional question is whether
Congress can regulate such persons, not just one individual. In addition, it
would be awkward if the Court offered advice to Congress as to how best to
draft federal statutes that would lead to most statutes being unconstitutional.
Thus, the two techniques of statutory draftsmanship come close to
merging.392
Let us apply this analysis to Raich itself, assuming that the statute had
been drafted to forbid any possession of marijuana with an effect on
interstate commerce. The first question is whether economic/commercial
activity is present at all. Possession seems like a classic case of an activity
that falls outside the line, and we can perhaps assume that cultivation for
one's own use also falls outside. Nonetheless, there is the analysis utilized in
Raich, and derived from Wickard, that the homegrown marijuana
"overhangs" 393 the market and threatens to enter it.394 There is also the threat
to the federal regulatory scheme posed by the difficulties for law
enforcement officials in any attempt to distinguish between intrastate and
interstate marijuana. Thus, the economic/commercial line is satisfied. If the
conduct can be aggregated, as in a class-of-activities statute, utilization of a
jurisdictional element would lead to the same result, based on the same
analysis.
As for nexus jurisdictional elements, they have long been a staple of the
federal criminal law. Professors Abrams and Beale state that "federal
criminal jurisdiction under the commerce power has most often been based
on the direct crossing of an interstate boundary by way of transportation,
shipping, traveling or the like."' 395 The lower courts' receptive attitude toward
nexus statutes is a principal reason for the failure of Lopez-based
391 E.g., United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating the
issue in the case as "the application [of the statute] to McCoy in the circumstances
present here (or to others in similar circumstances).").
392 See United States v. Guerra, 164 F.3d 1358, 1358 (1 1th Cir. 1999) (treating the
Hobbs Act as regulating general conduct and applying aggregation analysis); United
States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553, 558 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995) (applying Wirtz analysis concerning
general regulatory statutes to Hobbs Act). There may be a certain tension between
advocacy of jurisdictional element statutes, on the one hand, and hostility to Wickard on
the other.
393 Wickard v. Filburn, 371 U.S. 111, 128 (1942).
394 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2207.
395 ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 297, at 20.
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challenges. 396 An interesting exception is the treatment of the child
pornography statute. 397 The law is aimed at visual depictions involving the
use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. One of the alternative
jurisdictional elements is that the offending material "was produced using
materials which have been mailed or shipped or transported [in interstate or
foreign commerce]. '398 Obviously, this, like some other nexus elements, is
virtually meaningless, given the fact that photographic and similar materials
will almost always have an interstate shipment dimension. In United States v.
McCoy, the Ninth Circuit ruled that this jurisdictional element failed to
achieve the basic goal of limiting the reach of a federal statute to a discrete
set of activities. 399 It noted that the statute "encompasses virtually every case
imaginable, so long as any modem-day photographic equipment or material
has been used. '400 The court went on to decide the case as if the
jurisdictional element were absent.40 1 However, it focused on the relationship
between the requirement and the effect on interstate commerce, virtually
ignoring the possibility that the jurisdictional element could be viewed as an
example of legislation passed under categories one or two as outlined in
Lopez.4 02 Yet the fact of extensive movement of persons and goods in
interstate commerce makes it plausible to uphold such jurisdictional elements
under a channels analysis. In turn, such an approach means that Congress can
regulate virtually anything as long as it can make the tie to "commerce." As
Diane McGimsey puts it, the Court in Lopez "evinced no intention to
reexamine the channels or instrumentalities prongs of Congress's ability to
regulate under those prongs. Further, by highlighting the absence of a
jurisdictional element, the Court implied that its addition would validate an
396 E.g., United States v. Trupin, 117 F.3d 678, 685 n.3 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Numerous
statutes have been upheld against post-Lopez Commerce Clause challenges in this and
other courts."); United States v. Sirois, 87 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding 18
U.S.C. § 2251(a)); United States v. Sorrentino, 72 F.3d 294, 296 (2d Cir. 1995)
(upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(cij); United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 585-88 (3d Cir.
1995) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 2119). Professors Abrams and Beale also note a hospitable
attitude towards the Hobbs Act-an effects statute--even after Lopez. ABRAMs & BEALE,
supra note 297, at 32.
397 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2000).
398 Id. § 2252(a)(4)(B).
399 United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1124-26 (9th Cir. 2003).
400 Id. at 1124.
401 Id.
402 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995).
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otherwise unconstitutional statute. ' 403 Congress is likely to take up theinvitation.404
Commentators vary sharply as to the desirability of this situation,
although it seems hard to believe that the Court would go to such great
lengths to limit congressional power under one major technique, only to
endorse the possibility of circumventing its holdings through the use of
jurisdictional elements. McGimsey states that
[t]he Court's failure to put meaningful limits on the use of a
jurisdictional element to invoke Congress's Commerce Clause power leaves
federalism in the same place it was before the Court decided Lopez and
Morrison-seriously at risk. Federalism depends on limiting the use of the
commerce power to when there is a true connection to interstate commerce.
The current presumption that the crossing of state lines ensures a connection
to interstate commerce is erroneous.405
Some analysts are clearly not disturbed by the prospect that broad use of
nexus elements can lead to unlimited congressional power. Professors Stacy
and Dayton have stated that "a nexus with interstate commerce can be shown
in every case." 406 Professor Bradley, on the other hand, has expressed
doubts.40 7 Indeed, Professors Nelson and Pushaw have recommended
eliminating jurisdiction based on categories one and two.40 8
It is possible to analyze nexus elements as presenting an example of the
nonattenuation or noninfinity problem. That is, since virtually all people and
goods will have some connection with commerce through movement,
Congress can regulate them under the commerce power. This argument is
strikingly similar to that which the Court rejected in Lopez and Morrison
when confronted with arguments based on the commercial
403 Diane McGimsey, The Commerce Clause and Federalism after Lopez and
Morrison: The Case for Closing the Jurisdictional-Element Loophole, 90 CAL. L. REv.
1675, 1704 (2002).
404 Litman & Greenberg, supra note 20, at 940-54 (discussing revised Gun Free
School Zones Act based on movement of firearms in interstate commerce, and the basis
of the new statute in categories one and two).
405 McGimsey, supra note 403, at 1706. McGimsey states that "the lower federal
courts have consistently upheld statutes based on the mere presence of a jurisdictional
element." Id. at 1709.
406 Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, The Underfederalization of Crime, 6 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 247, 297 (1997).
407 Bradley, supra note 17, at 600.
408 Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 215, at 107-13.
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interconnectedness of our society.409 Harry Litman and Mark Greenberg
have mounted a spirited defense of a broad use of nexus jurisdictional
elements, although even they recognize the need for some limits.4 10 Their
essential formulation is as follows: whatever the outer limits on the
commerce power, the use of the power to regulate harms of which interstate
commerce is a cause is straightforward. 411 They recognize the problem of
happenstance movement in interstate commerce, and recommend an
approach similar to the proximate cause concept widespread in torts
analysis.412 Diane McGimsey has examined a series of limitations and
focuses on what she refers to as the "purpose-nexus requirement. '413 I do not
think that Raich provides any direct answer to the question, although, as
argued above, its insistence on the economic/commercial line also should be
taken as expressing support for a limited commerce power such as that
guaranteed by the nonattenuation principle. In any event, over the course of
ten years, the Court has issued three major decisions on the constitutional
dimensions of substantial effects regulation.414 One should probably add the
important statutory construction decision in Jones.4 15 It is time for guidance
as to how to handle regulation under categories one and two through the use
of jurisdictional elements of the nexus variety. The Court may have provided
the beginning of this guidance when it remanded a gun control case for
reconsideration in light of Raich.416 However, in the remanded case, the
court of appeals had taken a narrow view of nexus elements. 417
409 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995).
410 Litman & Greenberg supra note 20, at 921.
411 Id. at 950.
4 1 2 Id. at 921; see ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 297, at 28.
413 McGimsey, supra note 403, at 1731-35 ("The purpose nexus would solve most
of the problems discussed earlier regarding the lower courts' opinions, both by limiting
statutes that might legitimately fall within Congress's Commerce Clause power but have
been too expansively interpreted, and by invalidating statutes that do not fall within
Congress's Commerce Clause power at all.").
414 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
415 See generally Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
416 United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2899
(2005).
417 Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1136 ("[J]ust because certain of the elements that make up
an object have traveled interstate at one time or another, this does not necessarily mean
Congress can regulate that object under the Commerce Clause."); see also United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 n.5 (2000) (suggesting approval of criminal provisions of
the Violence Against Women Act based on their requirement of interstate travel).
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F. Raich and the Outer Limits of Federal Criminal Law
Raich poses, in stark form, the question of the outer limits of federal
criminal statutes enacted under the Commerce Clause: at what point is an
activity so intrastate, so removed from "commerce," and, seemingly, so
removed from the concerns of the federal government that the latter should
not be able to regulate it? The general problem may be referred to as that of
parallel private activity. As Justice O'Connor put it in her Raich dissent:
Most commercial goods or services have some sort of privately producible
analogue. Homecare substitutes for daycare. Charades games substitute for
movie tickets. Backyard or windowsill gardening substitutes for going to
the supermarket. To draw the line wherever private activity affects the
demand for market goods is to draw no line at all, and to declare everything
economic. We have already rejected the result that would follow-a federal
police power.418
The theme is a recurring one among conservative judges, and often leads
to a parade of horribles. Justice Thomas, in Raich, raised the question of
whether the national government may now "regulate quilting bees, clothes
drives, and potluck suppers throughout the 50 states. '419 Assuming that there
is no separate external limit on broad uses of the commerce power to reach
intrastate activity, the answer must be found in Commerce Clause
jurisprudence itself. The source of the problem, if it is one, is the opinion in
Wickard, and its broad willingness to embrace small-scale intrastate activity
in a general regulatory scheme.420
The much-litigated field of "personal" pornography provides a good
example.421 The key provision of the federal statutory scheme in question
418 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2225 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She referred explicitly to
the "outer limits" of the Commerce Clause, id. at 2223, and to Justice Kennedy's defense
of judicial review in enforcing them. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring);
see United States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225, 231, 233 n.32 (5th Cir. 2000) (Jolly, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing broad application of the Commerce Clause to intrastate activity on
the ground that "[a]n intrastate market exists for virtually any product one might
possess.").
419 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2236 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
420Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942) ("That appellee's own
contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him
from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with
that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.") (citation omitted).
421 E.g., United States v. Mugan, 394 F.3d 1016 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Smith, 402 F.3d 1303 (1 1th Cir.
2005), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2938 (2005); United States v. Morales-de Jesus, 372 F.3d 6
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makes it a crime to "knowingly possesses I or more books, magazines,
periodicals, films, video tapes, or other matter which contain any visual
depiction ... if the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and such visual depiction is of
such conduct. '422 The 2003 Ninth Circuit decision in United States v.
McCoy 423 is worth in-depth consideration for several reasons. First, the facts
present a compelling argument for a private, personal, non-commercial act.
In addition, the Ninth Circuit decision in Raich, reversed by the Supreme
Court, relied heavily on McCoy.424 Finally, the Supreme Court's action in
vacating and remanding two child pornography cases 425 for reconsideration
in light of Raich, may shed light on earlier cases such as McCoy.
McCoy presented a tawdry set of facts, typical of many of these cases.426
Apparently under the influence of alcohol, a father photographed his wife
and ten-year-old stepdaughter. The photograph of the daughter meets the
statutory definition of "sexually explicit conduct." The husband was a Naval
Petty Officer, and the matter ultimately ended up in the hands of federal law
enforcement agents. I think it is useful to examine McCoy as a classic outer
limits case without consideration of any possible federal interest in the
conduct of Naval personnel. After all, the husband's status would make no
difference in determining the reach of the statute. Although the court of
appeals referred to both a facial and an as-applied challenge, its analytical
focus is solely on the latter.427 The court applied428 the four-part test
discussed above.429 Although this test is no longer operational after Raich, it
does involve examining the application of the economic/commercial line, as
well as questions of the definition of the subclass to which that line applies in
as-applied challenges. As treated by the McCoy Court, the two issues are
closely interrelated, as they were in Raich.
(1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Andrews, 383 F.3d 374 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Holston, 343 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir.
2003); United States v. Galo, 239 F.3d 572 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Kallestad,
236 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2000).
422 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (2000).
423 United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2003).
424 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Gonzales v.
Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
425 United States v. Smith, 402 F.3d 1303 (1 1th Cir. 2005), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2938
(2005); United States v. Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042 (11th Cit. 2004), vacated, 126 S. Ct.
321 (2005).
42 6 McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1115.
42 7 Id. at 1119-29.
4 2 8 Id. at 1117-30.
429 See supra notes 316-18.
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The Ninth Circuit rejected outright any role for the jurisdictional element
relied on by the government: a requirement that the materials used to produce
the depiction have been transported in commerce by any means.430 It found
that the jurisdictional element failed to limit the statute in any way, and that it
encompasses virtually every case imaginable. 431 Like other courts of appeals,
it saw intrastate pornography as presenting a category three substantial
effects issue.432 The opinion focused on that through consideration of the
nature of the defendant's activities as compared to those in Wickard.433 It
noted the uncertain economic/commercial background of that case, 434 but
quoted Morrison to the effect that "in every case where we have sustained
federal regulation under the aggregation principle in Wickard v.
Filburn... the regulated activity was of an apparent commercial
character." 435 For the Ninth Circuit there was a substantial difference
between the wheat in Wickard and the pornographic material in McCoy. As
to the former, "its very existence had an economic effect," while "McCoy's
photo does not have any plausible economic impact on the child pornography
industry. '436 In other words, the photo was neither potentially economic nor
did its purely intrastate possession affect federal regulation of interstate
commerce. The Ninth Circuit devoted considerable attention to rebutting the
Third Circuit decision in United States v. Rodia,437 which rested in part on a
notion of "addiction," that is, that "the possession of 'homegrown'
pornography may well stimulate a further interest in pornography that
immediately or eventually animates demand for interstate pornography. '438
The Ninth Circuit also rejected any fungibility analysis of the family
pornographic photo. 439
430 This jurisdictional element states that any child pornography "that has been
mailed, or has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce... or that
was produced using materials that have been mailed, or shipped or transported ... by any
means, including by computer" falls within the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B)
(2000).
431 United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003). The court stated
that "the limiting jurisdictional factor is almost useless here." Id. at 1125.
432 E.g., United States v. Smith, 402 F.3d 1303, 1317 (1 th Cir. 2005), vacated, 125
S. Ct. 2938 (2005); United States v. Holston, 343 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 2003).
433 McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1120-33.
4 3 4 Id. at 1120.
4 35 Id. (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 n.4 (2000)).
436 Id. at 1121 n.1l.
437 United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 465 (3d Cir. 1999).
438 Id. at 477-78.
439United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003). Perhaps
unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit compared homegrown pornography to possession of a
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Although some circuits have apparently rejected the possibility of as-
applied challenges to the pornography statute, 440 the Ninth Circuit in McCoy
followed the majority of courts of appeals in allowing an as-applied
challenge. 441 The definition of the class is inherently bound up with the
determination as to the economic/commercial nature of the activity. If this
latter hurdle had been overcome, the next step would have been to measure
the aggregate effect of the class on interstate commerce. The description of
the class is key. The Ninth Circuit first described the class in the following
highly general terms that seem so closely related to the legal standard as to
prejudge the answer:
At issue here is whether a statute enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause
may constitutionally reach non-commercial, non-economic individual
conduct that is purely intrastate in nature, when there is no reasonable basis
for concluding that the conduct had or was intended to have any significant
interstate connection or any substantive effect on interstate commerce.44 2
Beyond the fact that it states the proposition in a manner that refutes it,
this description does not help the analysis by singling out the particular
nature of the defendants' activities. The court later defined the class-of-
activity more specifically as "non-commercial, non-economic, simple
intrastate possession of photographs for personal use."443 The court made
clear that its analysis applied to McCoy and to others similarly situated. In
order to strengthen the case for treating this class as outside the reach of
federal law, the Court might have emphasized even further the family
dimension of the photograph.444 Factual emphasis is important in contending
that an activity is beyond the outer limits of the federal commerce power.
What is the impact of Raich and the subsequent remands on McCoy?
There are two guideposts in attempting to formulate an answer. The first is a
comparison of the class whose as-applied challenge was considered in Raich
to the class presented in McCoy. In Raich, the Ninth Circuit defined the class
single marijuana cigarette and the possibility that that could lead to further addiction. Id.
As for the legislative history, the Court found it inconclusive. Id. at 1128.
440 United States v. Mugan, 394 F.3d 1016 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Holston,
343 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Galo, 239 F.3d 572 (3d Cir. 2001).
441 United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Smith,
402 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2005), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2938 (2005); United States v.
Morales-de Jesus, 372 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Andrews, 383 F.3d 374
(6th Cir. 2004); United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2000).
44 2 McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1117.
443Id. at 1133.
444 The Court made passing references to the family dimension. Id. at 1122, 1132.
1008 [Vol. 66:947
NATIONAL CRIMINAL LA WAFTER RAICH
of activities as "the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation, possession and use
of marijuana for personal, medical purposes on the advice of a physician and
in accordance with state law."445 At the Supreme Court level, Justice
Stevens, for the majority, whittled down this class to "the intrastate,
noncommercial cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana." 446 If one
substitutes production for cultivation and child pornography for marijuana,
the two classes look remarkably similar, particularly if one views
pornographic materials as fungible. It is also important to remember that we
are dealing with a particular form of federal commercial regulation: a ban on
an activity or product. Thus it seems entirely possible that a court applying
Raich will rely on the Wickard analysis to conclude that the personal product
can become part of the commercial market and/or that the consumer of this
product could move into that market as well.44 7 The counter-argument can be
stated as follows: the family nature of the photograph in a case like McCoy is
a strong point of differentiation. The possessor would not want it to fall into
non-family hands. Whether this distinction will be sufficient is, at the
moment, an open question.
It is at this point that the second guidepost becomes important. One of
the cases vacated and remanded for consideration in light of Raich is the
March 2005 decision of the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Smith.448 In
Smith, the defendant was engaged in both production and possession of what
the court viewed as intrastate child pornography.449 The Eleventh Circuit
engaged in an extensive analysis of Wickard, in the context of "purely
intrastate production and possession for personal use .... "450 The key to the
analysis is the difference between wheat, which is inherently part of a
national market, and obscene photographs which, in the court's view, are not.
I will quote at length from the Circuit's treatment of the Wickard analysis:
Even if, in the aggregate, offenders like Smith somehow impact an
interstate market by producing child pornography for their own use,
Congress is clearly not concerned with the supply of child pornography for
the purpose of avoiding surpluses and shortages or for the purpose of
stimulating its trade at increased prices .... The conclusion is thus
445 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1229 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Gonzales
v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
446 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2211 (2005) (quoting Raich, 352 F.3d at
1229).
447 Id. at 2207 n.28.
448 United States v. Smith, 402 F.3d 1303 (1 1th Cir. 2005), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2938
(2005).
449Id. at 1315-18.
450Id. at 1321.
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inevitable that the statutes under which Smith was convicted are not
concerned with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however
broadly one might define those terms.45 1
This analysis may not give appropriate weight to the Wickard
comparison in the context of a ban of a product as opposed to a price
regulation scheme. There are two additional factors that weaken the opinion
in Smith. It relied heavily on the Ninth Circuit decision in Raich.452 In
addition, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized that if Smith were to be
prosecuted, that prosecution should come from the state, rather than from the
federal government. 453 Thus, one could conclude from the remand, following
almost directly on the rendering of the Raich decision, that Smith is a prime
candidate for reversal. It may not follow, however, that such an action would
carry over to a case like McCoy. Smith was a commercial operator who paid
at least some of his subjects and, when arrested, was in possession of 1768
pictures.454 Perhaps the familial and personal nature of the possession of one
photograph is enough to differentiate McCoy from the activities of a small-
time hustler like the defendant in Smith. If so, there is a line that will be
developed through as-applied challenges. If not, if on similar facts the next
McCoy leads to a successful prosecution, Raich will have gone far to extend
the outer limits of federal power to conduct what would seem, to many,
beyond that power.455 To those who find this troubling, the answer may well
lie not in the Commerce Clause, but in other parts of the Constitution,
notably the Due Process Clause, that might be interpreted to protect the
activity in question from prosecution by any government. Short of that, it is
true that one can probably rely on congressional drafting, prosecutorial
discretion, and a shortage of federal resources to obviate the prospect of
federal prosecution of quilting bees, clothes drives, and potluck suppers.
Still, for those who seek some form of demarcation in a government of
enumerated and limited powers, the prospect of a successful prosecution in
the next McCoy case is not a comforting one.
451 Id. at 1318 (citation omitted).
452 Id.
413 Id. at 1327-28.
454 United States v. Smith, 402 F.3d 1303, 1310-11 (1ith Cir. 2005), vacated, 125
S. Ct. 2938 (2005).
455 See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 215, at 158-59 (discussing outer limits
problem).
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V. CONCLUSION-RAICH AND THE NEW FEDERALISM
The Supreme Court decision in Gonzalez v. Raich represents a setback
for the New Federalism. The Court had a golden opportunity to extend that
concept by upholding a Ninth Circuit decision that limited intrastate
applications of the Federal Controlled Substances Act.45 6 Particularly
noteworthy was the fact that state law Would have permitted the conduct at
issue, thus permitting the state to serve a classic "laboratory" function.
Instead, the Supreme Court reversed, upholding the supremacy and sweep of
federal law. Totally absent from the majority opinion were such staples of
New Federalism rhetoric as state sovereignty, spheres of autonomy, and a
paramount state role in criminal law. 457 Also absent was any suggestion of
federalism itself as a separate and independent concept with constitutional
force. 458 This Article contends that the decision is a setback for the New
Federalism, but not a rollback.459 The result is not Lopez-Lite or the non-
federalism of Justices Breyer and Souter. The Court upheld the
economic/commercial line for establishing the validity of federal regulations
that purport to deal with matters having a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. The Article also argues that, although the nonattenuation
principle does not appear in the majority opinion, it is implicit in the Court's
expressed need for a limiting category of federal authority such as the
economic/commercial line.460
Raich helps answer some questions about the future of federal criminal
law. It is likely that that law will continue to grow in a manner that overlaps
with state criminal statutes.461 Any attempt at a sharp demarcation through
separate spheres seems doomed. Raich also appears to settle an important
dispute by confirming that as-applied challenges can be brought to intrastate
applications of class-of-activities statutes.462 However, it must be noted that
the Court's opinion raises doubts as to how often those challenges will
succeed. It is clear that statutes with jurisdictional elements, as opposed to
the class-of-activity statute in Raich, pose serious conceptual problems, many
of which have yet to be addressed by the Court in the post-Lopez era. In
456 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1234 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Gonzales
v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
457 See supra Part II.B.
458 Id.
4 59 See supra Part III.A-B.
4 60 See supra Part IV.C.
461 See supra Part II.B.
462 See supra Part II.B.
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particular, it seems unlikely that the Court would countenance a use of
jurisdictional elements based on the channels or instrumentalities categories
of commerce that completely undercuts what it tried to accomplish in Lopez.
One must admit that the answer is not clear. Even less clear are the problems
of the outer limits of federal statutes. Are there instances of private, intrastate
conduct that federal law cannot reach, despite the presence of a generally
valid statute that seems to condemn them?
Beyond the federal criminal law, broader questions arise concerning the
impact of Raich on the New Federalism. 463 I have used that term to refer to
efforts by the current Court to strengthen the state role within the overall
federal balance. As many observers have noted,464 the concept encompasses
a range of areas, some constitutional, some sub-constitutional, and some
statutory. One of the most important dimensions of the New Federalism
debate is that there will be no clear resolution, just as there can never be any
clear resolution of American federalism. The decisions of the Court placed
under this rubric are not what Justice Souter condescendingly referred to as
an attempt to return to "[t]he federalism of an earlier time. '465 Rather, they
are an attempt to maintain a balance between the two levels in a complex,
highly intergovermentalized system.466 Raich will not be counted as a New
Federalism decision,467 despite elements of the concept that remain alive
within it. In particular, those who support the Court's previous efforts to
strengthen the state role are likely to criticize the decision for its heavy
reliance on Wickard v. Filburn.4 68 At the doctrinal level, conservatives may
criticize Raich for failing to clarify the relationship between Wickard and
Lopez, that is, utilizing the latter to limit the former. However, the case
reminds us of an equally important element of the dynamic: the supremacy of
the federal government, acting within its enumerated powers, is part of the
glue that holds the system together.
463 See supra Part 1V.D.
464 E.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 429, 429 (2002); R. Shep Melnick,
Deregulating the States: The Political Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, in
INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC LAW: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES 69-95 (Tom Ginsburg &
Robert Kagan eds., 2005).
465 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 655 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
466 See generally, Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative
Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96
MICH L. REV. 813, 813 (1998).
467 See Randy E. Barnett, William Rehnquist, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2005, at A28
(criticizing Raich as contrary to the New Federalism).
468 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. III (1942).
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